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I. INTRODUCTION
In this era of rapid technological innovation, business enti-
ties face many exciting corporate opportunities. These business
entities, however, may not be prepared to exploit new corporate
opportunities that they encounter. A business's inability to im-
mediately take advantage of profitable opportunities under-
standably tempts fiduciaries within these entities, who learn of
the opportunities through their employment, to consider per-
sonally taking the opportunities. But the common law corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine may prevent a fiduciary from taking
and developing business opportunities even though his business
cannot or is not prepared to exploit the opportunities.
As purposely stated above, the corporate opportunity doc-
trine may, not necessarily will, prevent a fiduciary from person-
ally developing corporate opportunities because it is not clear in
many jurisdictions what constitutes a corporate opportunity. It
is even less clear what constitutes an illegal usurpation, or tak-
ing, of a corporate opportunity, which violates a fiduciary's duty
of loyalty.
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The disordered landscape of corporate opportunity law sug-
gests that a clear, uniform statute should be adopted by the
states to afford fiduciaries a semblance of predictability across
jurisdictions. The statute should retain a relatively strict ad-
herence to the duty of loyalty, while not preventing fiduciaries
from taking opportunities that a business cannot reasonably ex-
ploit when presented. As developed below, the statute rejects
strict bright-line rules, but also eliminates any judicial inquiry
into the inherent fairness of a fiduciary's conduct.
The strict corporate opportunity tests unduly inhibit the ef-
ficient development of corporate opportunities because a fiduci-
ary must either completely refrain from taking any business
opportunity or must first offer the opportunity to his business
and obtain the business's consent. The fairness tests, moreover,
fail to promote predictability because they give judges, mostly
state appellate judges, too much discretion to decide cases on
fact-specific equitable considerations.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the fiduciary duty of
loyalty and the development of the corporate opportunity doc-
trine. The current corporate opportunity tests and defenses,
which are applied by courts to determine whether a fiduciary is
liable under the doctrine, are also examined. The tests and de-
fenses are few, but courts have created certain nuances within
the general tests that will be explored.
Part III proposes a model corporate opportunity statute.
First, the statute rejects the view that public business entities
should be treated differently from closely held entities because
such a distinction is unnecessary as it adds a layer of confusion
to a court's analysis and, in most cases, is not applicable to the
analysis. It will not be applicable because most corporate op-
portunity claims arise in closely held entities.
Second, the statute rejects by omission the strict views of
the doctrine, which posit that a fiduciary must never personally
take an opportunity or that she must first disclose the opportu-
nity to her business before pursuing the opportunity. These
strict views inhibit allocative efficiency and innovation because,
although a business may not be able to take initially an oppor-
tunity because of financial reasons, it may sit on the opportu-
nity until it believes it can profitably exploit the opportunity. In
the meantime, the business opportunity may be lost to a com-
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petitor or may disappear altogether. The proposed statute re-
jects strict disclosure and permits a fiduciary to take an
opportunity without notifying the business. The danger for the
fiduciary, however, is that although the initial burden of show-
ing a corporate opportunity is placed on the business, its bur-
den, in many cases, will easily be met.
Under the proposed statute, a business will be able to es-
tablish the existence of a corporate opportunity by satisfying
the criteria for establishing a corporate opportunity under any
of the current tests. Consequently, in many cases, the burden of
persuasion will shift to the fiduciary and she will have to estab-
lish by clear and convincing evidence that the business (1) con-
sented to the fiduciary's taking before the fiduciary proceeded;
(2) was initially unable to take the opportunity because of finan-
cial constraints; or (3) ratified the taking of the opportunity af-
ter it learned of the fiduciary's conduct. Finally, the proposed
statute purposefully omits several fiduciary defenses that do
not promote allocative efficiency and economic innovation, are
not consistent with a hypothetical contract theory of the duty of
loyalty, or are so inherently amorphous that they reduce pre-
dictability under the doctrine.
Part IV discusses the proposed statute in detail focusing on
how rejection of the strict tests will promote greater flexibility
for fiduciaries to take opportunities their entities are not finan-
cially able to exploit. Recognizing the nature of business in the
information age, this flexibility again seeks to promote alloca-
tive efficiency and economic innovation. Part IV also focuses on
why the financial inability defense is retained in the proposed
statute. The financial inability defense is maintained for the
same reasons the strict tests are discarded. This defense en-
ables a fiduciary to exploit efficiently opportunities that her
business is unable to exploit. Moreover, such a defense is con-
sistent with a hypothetical contract theory of the fiduciary duty
of loyalty, which examines what the parties would have ex-
pressly contracted for if the issue were contemplated before the
fiduciary's employment. Finally, Part IV contends the fairness
tests, utilized by several courts, are intellectually unsatisfying
in our relatively ordered economic system. Fairness tests create
uncertainty for both entities and fiduciaries, and are, therefore,
rejected.
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II. THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE AND
ITS TESTS AND DEFENSES
The corporate opportunity doctrine and the duty of loyalty
are intertwined to the extent that courts created the corporate
opportunity doctrine to enforce a fiduciary's duty of loyalty to
her business.1 The duty of loyalty mandates that a fiduciary
must act in the interests of her business; however, such a duty
does not rise to the level of duty inherent in a principal/agent
relationship. 2 To enforce a fiduciary's duty of loyalty, courts
have created or adopted several tests to (1) establish whether
an opportunity taken by a fiduciary is a corporate opportunity;
and (2) determine whether the fiduciary breached her duty of
loyalty by taking the opportunity. 3 Although most courts merge
the two inquiries into one corporate opportunity analysis, 4 both
are distinct inquiries, and, therefore, will be examined as sepa-
rate and independent inquiries during this Article's evaluation
of the current tests.
A. The Duty of Loyalty as a Gap-Filling Measure in
Fiduciary Contracts
As a brief introduction, this section examines the scope of
the duty of loyalty in relation to the corporate opportunity doc-
trine. The duty of loyalty in the corporate opportunity context
restricts the ability of a fiduciary to usurp corporate opportuni-
ties that come to her during her employment with a business.
As a general rule, courts that find violations of the duty of loy-
alty (and, consequently, violations of the corporate opportunity
doctrine) impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of the un-
lawfully taken opportunity.
More importantly, this section discusses and proposes a
contractual theory of the duty of loyalty on which this Article's
proposed statute is anchored. Specifically, the proposed statute
accepts two controversial assumptions concerning the duty of
loyalty in the corporate opportunity context. First, the duty of
loyalty is, and should be, enforced by courts as an implied term
1. See infra Section A of Part II.
2. See infra Section A of Part II.
3. See infra Section B of Part II.
4. See infra Section B of Part II.
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of a fiduciary's contract with her business. Therefore, the duty
of loyalty should be used as a gap-filling measure inserted and
enforced by courts ex post to satisfy the probable implied ex ante
intentions of the parties to the fiduciary contract. Second, be-
cause the duty of loyalty is, and should be, a judicially applied
gap-filler, the parties to fiduciary contracts may modify or
waive the duty of loyalty in all or some circumstances by enter-
ing into express agreements defining the scope of the fiduciary's
duty of loyalty.
1. The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and the Duty of
Loyalty
Under the common law and most, if not all, state business
organization statutes, "[c]orporate officers and directors bear a
duty of loyalty to the [business] they serve"5 and "[t]he doctrine
of corporate opportunity represents but one species of the broad
fiduciary duties assumed by a corporate director or officer."6
"[Glut of this relationship arises a duty of reasonably protecting
the interests of the [business] ."7 "Accordingly, [a fiduciary] may
not profit personally at the expense of the [business] .... If he
does so profit, he may be held to be a trustee, as to those profits,
for the benefit of the corporation."8 In other words, if a fiduciary
breaches his duty of loyalty to his business, the corporate "op-
portunity and any property or profit acquired [by the fiduciary]
becomes subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of the
5. Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1148 (Me. 1995).
6. Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154 (Del. 1995); see also Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("The rule, referred to briefly as the rule of
corporate opportunity, is merely one of the manifestations of the general rule that
demands of an officer or director the utmost good faith in his relation to the corpo-
ration which he represents.").
7. Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 522, 527 (Mass. 1948); see also
Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 140 N.W.2d 132, 136 (Iowa 1966); Mary-
land Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (Md. 1978) ("[The] concern for the
integrity of the employment relationship has led courts to establish a rule that
demands of a corporate officer or employee an undivided and unselfish loyalty to
the corporation."); Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 53 A.2d 143, 147 (Pa. 1947) ("[Of-
ficers and directors] must devote themselves to the corporate affairs with a view to
promote the common interests and not their own, and they cannot, either directly
or indirectly, utilize their position to obtain any personal profit or advantage other
than that enjoyed also by their fellow shareholders.") (citation omitted).
8. Chem. Dynamics, Inc. v. Newfeld, 728 S.W.2d 590, 592-93 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
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[business]."9 Punitive damages also may be available to a pre-
vailing plaintiff in some states. 10
Under modern business organization statutes, the duty of
loyalty is codified and represents a substantive and important
limitation on fiduciary conduct to address a perceived vulnera-
bility of principals to the "unfaithful" conduct of their fiducia-
ries. The duty of loyalty, therefore, enforces a simple
proposition: that fiduciaries are to put the interests of their bus-
iness before their private entrepreneurial interests while they
serve as fiduciaries.
2. The Hypothetical Contract Model and Fiduciary Duty
As an outgrowth of the law-and-economics movement,
many courts and commentators have accepted the proposition
that one of the functions of contract law is to complete agree-
ments between parties by inserting missing terms into the par-
ties' contract ex post." Judge Richard Posner, one of the
preeminent advocates of applying the laws of economics to legal
issues, notes that this ex post judicial interpolation of contract
clauses reduces the cost of contracting (thereby increasing eco-
nomic efficiency) because parties have difficultly contemplating
every possible circumstance that could arise during their mu-
tual performance:
The longer performance will take-and bear in mind that in per-
formance we must include the entire stream of future services
that the exchange contemplates-the harder it will be for the par-
ties to foresee the various contingencies that might affect per-
formance .... [Slome contingencies, even though foreseeable in
the strong sense that both parties are fully aware that they may
occur, are so unlikely to occur that the costs of careful drafting to
9. Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (Minn. 1974) (citation omitted); see also
Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 899 (2d Cir. 1967) (applying New York law); Lagarde
v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 28 So. 199, 201 (Ala. 1900); Note, Corporate Oppor-
tunity in the Close Corporation-A Different Result?, 56 GEO. L.J. 381, 382 (1967);
Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARv. L. REV. 765, 765 (1961). Although the pro-
posed statute does not adopt a particular remedy, a constructive trust remedy also
may lead to over-deterrence of independent fiduciary economic activity because of
its all-or-nothing application.
10. See generally Longwell v. Custom Benefit Programs Midwest, Inc., 627
N.W.2d 396, 400 (S.D. 2001).
11. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 92-94 (4th ed.
1992).
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
deal with them might exceed the benefits, when those benefits are
discounted by the (low) probability that the contingency will actu-
ally occur. It may be cheaper for the court to "draft" the contrac-
tual term necessary to deal with the contingency if and when it
occurs. 
12
The unresolved question we are left with after accepting this
role for the courts in providing implied terms to silent contracts
is: How, and in what way, should a court go about determining
and inserting terms in a silent contract? The answer, according
to Judge Posner, is to "imagine how the parties would have pro-
vided for the contingency if they had decided to do so."13 This
entails "decid[ing] what the most efficient way of dealing with
the contingency is. For this is the best way of deciding how the
parties would have provided for [the contingency] .",,4
Therefore, we have an initial framework that examines the
parties' intentions through an efficiency-minded lens; but, what
if, after an investigation into the parties' intentions, a court con-
cludes that the parties would have provided for the contingency
in an inefficient way? Or, as Posner notes, "If the law is to take
its cues from economics, should efficiency or intentions gov-
ern?"15 In this case, the perceived inefficient intentions of the
parties should govern because "people who make a transac-
tion-thus putting their money where their mouths are-ordi-
narily are more trustworthy judges of their self-interest than a
judge (or jury), who has neither a personal stake in nor first-
hand acquaintance with the venture."'16 Consequently, if there
is clear evidence of the probable intentions of the parties where
there is no express term covering an unprovided for contin-
gency, a court should defer to the parties' intentions even in the
face of the court's conclusion that those intentions are economi-
cally inefficient.
Because fiduciaries and their businesses negotiate con-
tracts, employment or otherwise, that define the rights and obli-
gations of each party, an efficiency-minded, gap-filling, or
"bargain-substitute" framework seems well suited to interpret
12. Id. at 92-93.
13. Id. at 93.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. POSNER, supra note 11, at 93.
[Vol. 23:83
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/3
20021 Corporate Opportunity and a Proposed Statute 91
these types of contracts as well. Although the commentary is
not unanimous, 17 recent scholarship, consistent with Posner's
general contract framework, suggests courts should impose cor-
porate opportunity duty of loyalty rules to "fill the gap" in the
performance of express or implied fiduciary contracts.' 8 Fiduci-
aries and businesses, like other contracting parties, need courts
to "fill the gap" in contracts because the costs associated with
contemplating every possible corporate opportunity scenario,
and agreeing to mutual performance in each scenario, would be
prohibitively high.19
17. In addition to the contractarian view of the duty of loyalty, some "tradi-
tionalists [regard] fiduciary duties as the doctrinal cousin to the law of trusts."
Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Cor-
porate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277, 299 (1998). Under this ap-
proach, a fiduciary's duties are similar to those of a common law trustee. Id.
Another approach is the "communitarian" approach, which has gained popularity
in recent years. See id. at 302. Communitarians posit that "allocati[ve] decisions
made within a firm can have significant stakes for numerous other constituencies,
including employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and surrounding communi-
ties." Id. An example of a "communitarian" corporate statute can be found in
many states, including Minnesota. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 5
(1985). These statutes permit a board of directors, in discharging its duties, and
"in considering the best interests of the corporation," to "consider the interests of
the corporation's employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of
the state and nation, community and societal considerations." Id. Application of
the communitarian approach in the corporate opportunity context, however, is still
relatively indeterminate and therefore is not currently a useful model. See Talley,
supra, at 303.
18. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987)
(suggesting that "[because fiduciary duty is a standby or off-the-rack guess about
what parties would agree to if they dickered about the subject explicitly, parties
may contract with greater specificity for other arrangements. It is a violation of
duty to steal from the corporate treasury; it is not a violation to write oneself a
check that the board has approved as a bonus."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993); Scott W.
Fielding, Note, Free Competition or Corporate Theft?: The Need for Courts to Con-
sider the Employment Relationship in Preliminary Steps Disputes, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 201, 223-24 (1999) (recognizing a hypothetical-bargain view); Thomas A.
Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of
Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 216-17 (1999).
19. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Corporate Opportunity and Comparative Ad-
vantage, 84 IOWA L. REV. 211, 221 (1999) ("Generally-worded contracts of employ-
ment embody all the uncertainty and room for argument that characterize the
existing fiduciary-based doctrine. Attempts to deal with these problems through
greater specificity raise the challenge of contemplating and providing for endless
contingencies in a world of limited knowledge (the so-called 'bounded rationality'
problem)."); Andrew J. Nussbaum, Like Money in the Bank?: An Economic Analysis
9
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Professor Pat Chew, consistent with the framework above,
argues that corporate opportunity
disputes [should] be resolved according to the expectations of both
the corporation and the fiduciaries. In the optimal situation the
parties will have an express agreement on how they expect to re-
solve corporate opportunity disputes. In the absence of an agree-
ment, the courts should determine what their reasonable
expectations would have been.20
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel also im-
ply, in their general contract-based analysis of fiduciary duty,
that enforcement of the duty of loyalty between officers/direc-
tors and their businesses "replaces detailed contractual terms,
and courts flesh out the duty of loyalty by prescribing the ac-
tions the parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining
were cheap and all promises fully enforced."21 "The fiduciary re-
lationship, in other words, is rarely an all-or-nothing proposi-
tion, and in interpreting the implicit contract that underlies
that relationship we need to determine the appropriate
balance."22
One criticism of the gap-filling or hypothetical contract ap-
proach to fiduciary duty (one I partially concede later in the Ar-
of Fiduciary Duties to Protect the S & L Deposit Insurance Fund, 44 ADMIN. L. REV.
355, 359-62 (1992).
20. Pat K. Chew, Competing Interests in the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine,
67 N.C. L. REV. 435, 439 (1989). Professor Chew describes her corporate opportu-
nity model as a "reasonable expectations model." Id. at 440.
21. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 427; cf. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 436-
37 (suggesting that the duty of a closely-held corporation to disclose material infor-
mation when repurchasing its shares from employee insiders may be modified by
express contract). Indeed, Easterbrook and Fischel contemplate one defense to a
fiduciary's usurpation of a corporate opportunity when they recognize that a
"board of directors may authorize a manager to pursue corporate opportunities"
notwithstanding the ability of the entity to develop the opportunity. Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 18, at 429; see also infra Section C of Part II. For a scathing
critique of Easterbrook and Fischel's general approach to corporate law and to con-
tractual theories of the duty of loyalty, see generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Cult of Efficiency, 71 TEX. L. REV. 217 (1992) (book review).
22. Davis, supra note 19, at 229; see also Talley, supra note 17, at 280-81
("[F]ashioning a rule that replicates (at least functionally) the allocation [of prop-
erty rights] that the parties themselves would have bargained for ex ante had they
anticipated such contingencies should be an important goal of the courts."). See
generally Fielding, supra note 18, at 226-27 (arguing that the hypothetical bargain
view of the duty of loyalty should be used to distinguish between relative duties of
loyalty based on employee status).
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ticle) is that it also suffers from a degree of indeterminacy and
thus may not offer a clearly superior alternative analysis for
courts to use when evaluating corporate opportunity claims. 23
This indeterminacy problem arises because "constructing the
supposed bargain of business partners after the fact may pro-
duce results as variable and random as those yielded by" the
traditional approaches to fiduciary duty.24 An example is the
case of Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.25 Here, Judges Easter-
brook and Posner (both strong advocates of the "gap-filling" pur-
pose of fiduciary duty) disagreed as to what the parties would
have contracted for in deciding whether Duff and Phelps had
breached a fiduciary duty of disclosure to Jordan in failing to
notify him that the company was about to be acquired before
repurchasing his stock.26
Nevertheless, while mindful of the objections made by the
traditionalist defenders of fiduciary duties, this Article's pro-
posed statute is based on a hypothetical contract model
grounded in a gap-filling theory of fiduciary duty. As developed
below, although a hypothetical contract model of corporate op-
portunity may suffer from some inherent indeterminacy, it is a
superior alternative to both strict disclosure theories of the cor-
porate opportunity doctrine, which may prohibitively inhibit al-
locative efficiency and distort efficient economic innovation, and
the fairness tests, which suffer from the lack of any guiding
principles.
Moreover, this theoretical framework for evaluating corpo-
rate opportunity claims attempts to blunt any possible indeter-
23. See Robert Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the
Limits of Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 57 (2000). For a more thorough critique
on this point, see generally Scott Fitzgibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Con-
tracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 323-24, 333-35 (1999); Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the
Subsidiary Director's Dilemma, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 326-30 (1996).
24. Hillman, supra note 23, at 58; see also Larry E. Ribstein, Efficiency, Regu-
lation and Competition: A Comment on Easterbrook & Fischel's Economic Struc-
ture of Corporate Law, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 254, 259 (1992) (noting that there are
threshold questions before accepting a hypothetical bargain theory; namely
"whether there is a gap to fill and whether the courts should fill gaps according to
this model").
25. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
26. See generally Hillman, supra note 23, at 58. For a more critical analysis of
Jordan, as well as a thorough examination of the underpinnings of corporate de-
fault rules, see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
11
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minacy created by a hypothetical contract approach by
providing that, in cases of clear indeterminacy, courts should
fill the gaps in fiduciary contracts with the more efficient term
or rule. For example, if a court is unclear whether the parties
would have contracted for strict disclosure of corporate opportu-
nities in the absence of an express contractual term, the court
should find that the parties would not have contracted for strict
disclosure because such a rule likely inhibits efficient economic
innovation and allocative efficiency. In other words, where in-
determinacy exists under the hypothetical contract approach,
the court should supply a term or rule that promotes the effi-
cient allocation of corporate opportunities.
3. A Contractual Theory of the Duty of Loyalty
Accepting the premise that fiduciary duties, and specifi-
cally the duty of loyalty,27 are merely gap-filling defaults, some
commentators have suggested that parties should be permitted
to modify or eliminate them by contract. 28 These commentators
concur with Easterbrook, Fischel, and Posner's general gap-fill-
ing theory of fiduciary duty and argue that a fiduciary and his
business may enter into an express contractual relationship for
the fiduciary to opt out of his duty of loyalty and liability under
the corporate opportunity doctrine. 29
27. The distinction between other fiduciary duties and the duty of loyalty may
be smaller than one expects after critically examining the substantive differences
between the duties. For instance, "[wihat is the difference between working less
hard than promised at a given level of compensation (a breach of the duty of care)
and being compensated more than promised at a given level of work (a breach of
the duty of loyalty)?" FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE Eco-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 103 (1991).
28. See generally David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited
Liability Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for
Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Lim-
ited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 459-64 (1998). For instance, Cohen
notes that in the L.L.C. context "states are permitting... parties to agree by con-
tract to the meaning of the duty [of loyalty], but are not allowing the elimination of
that duty." Id. at 462. He recognizes, however, the contradictory nature of such a
view of the duty of loyalty: "[Such view] seems contradictory. States trust the con-
tracting process and assume equal bargaining and adequate information, but do
not trust the process enough to eliminate the duty of loyalty. This strange combi-
nation of trust and lack of trust will lead to more litigation to help determine the
limits of contracting parties." Id.
29. See generally Richard A. Booth, Fiduciary Duty, Contract, and Waiver in
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 55,
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Indeed, a contractual theory of the duty of loyalty also could
solve statutorily or judicially created problems when each insti-
tution attempts to apply a hypothetical contract approach to
create default rules. For example, the freedom to contract out
of a strict duty of loyalty would permit parties to contract out of
actual or perceived inefficient gap-filling rules that may be cre-
ated by courts and legislatures attempting to reconstruct a hy-
pothetical contract term or rule ex post. Under this view,
although a hypothetical contract approach may be a superior
alternative to current rules, it still may not produce the desired
efficient results in every case. As two commentators have
noted:
It is, therefore, a mistake to identify the hypothetical bargain ap-
proach with the contract theory of the corporation .... If any-
thing, the defects of the hypothetical bargain approach provide
another argument in favor of the contract theory: To the extent
that courts and legislators follow this approach in adopting de-
fault provisions, it is important to permit the parties to opt out of
it in order to escape its defects. 30
Advocates of contractual theories of the duty of loyalty,
however, are presently fighting a war on two fronts against cur-
rent state law and the traditionalist defenders of fiduciary duty.
First, many state business organization statutes (especially
those governing corporations) expressly prohibit the modifica-
tion or complete elimination of the duty of loyalty; also, many
60 (1997) ("The fact that fiduciary duty can be abused indicates that it may be
worthwhile for parties entering into business to negotiate its scope .... If the
function of fiduciary duty is to supply missing contract terms, then it is difficult to
argue that the parties should not be allowed to negotiate about predictable contro-
versies if they think it is worthwhile to do so."); see also Chew, supra note 20, at
499 ("[A] contract negotiated in anticipation of possible corporat[e opportunity dis-
putes allows the parties to reflect carefully about what a fair and well-reasoned
resolution [to a dispute] would be."); Davis, supra note 19, at 229 ("Contract theory
would seem to be particularly suited to the corporate opportunity doctrine since its
object is the determination of what belongs to the corporation and what belongs to
the officer/director. Whatever the optimal rule, from a transaction-cost stand-
point, the parties could override it by contract."); Richard A. Epstein, Contract and
Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5
(1996). But see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 4 (1985) ("The articles [of in-
corporation] shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director... for any breach
of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders . .. ").
30. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990).
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expressly prohibit the limitation of damages for breaches of the
duty of loyalty. 31 Second, advocates of contractual theories of
the duty of loyalty have encountered fierce opposition from tra-
ditionalist defenders of fiduciary duty who argue that fiduciary
duties are something more than mere gap-filling contract
rules. 32 For instance, Judge Lawrence Mitchell has argued,
"The fiduciary principle underlying the duty of loyalty provides
a legal and social infrastructure for the trust a person necessa-
rily evidences when she enters into a relationship with another
to manage her property."33 In addition, according to Judge
Mitchell, expectations under a "hypothetical bargain ap-
proach ... necessarily will be formed in a context of inequality
and power disparity. To permit [hypothetical bargain] expecta-
tions formed in such an environment to govern [fiduciary] rela-
tionships is to abrogate the very reason for fiduciary duties in
the first place."34
Although these criticisms may be persuasive in the context
of other fiduciary relationships, for example, trustee/benefici-
ary, lawyer/client, etc., such worries are likely unfounded in the
context of corporate fiduciary contracts. 35 As will be further de-
veloped below, a contractual theory of the duty of loyalty con-
templates a bargaining atmosphere where the business and the
fiduciary have relatively equal bargaining strength. Moreover,
any decision to modify or eliminate a fiduciary's duty of loyalty
would still be subject to the business judgment rule, as well as
market forces that may prompt investors to liquidate their in-
terests in entities that agree to modify or eliminate their stan-
dards of fiduciary loyalty. For example, Henry Butler and
Larry Ribstein note:
31. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(7) (1974); MiNN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd.
4(a) (1985).
32. E.g., Fitzgibbon, supra note 23.
33. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 233. Scott Fitzgibbon similarly declares that
fiduciary duties "facilitate the doing of justice ... promote virtue, and ... enhance
freedom in a distinctive way." Fitzgibbon, supra note 23, at 305.
34. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 237 (citation omitted).
35. E.g., Fitzgibbon, supra note 23, at 306-08 (grouping corporate fiduciaries
into the same category as guardian/ward, bailee/bailor, physician/patient, and
priest/penitent fiduciary relationships without recognizing the significant substan-
tive differences between each fiduciary relationship).
[Vol. 23:83
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A thorough understanding of the Efficient Capital Markets Hy-
pothesis reveals that securities markets are efficient in the sense
that a corporate shareholder gets what he is paying for in both the
terms of the contract and the substantive nature of the product,
including the quality of management....
The information efficiently reflected in market prices includes the
terms of contracts constraining managerial discretion and the
prospects that this discretion will be exercised consistently with
investor interests. Any change in these contracts, and any change
in or new information about the managers of such a corporation,
such as their track records, reputations and the like, will be re-
ported in the financial media. Through the mechanisms of market
efficiency, this information is reflected in market price. And be-
cause information about contract terms and managers is accu-
rately reflected in market price, investors get what they pay for,
and capital is allocated to the most efficient firms.36
It is this axiomatic understanding of the market, therefore, that
would provide a market-based constraint on fiduciary conduct-
at least for publicly traded firms. Because the market would
necessarily constrain fiduciary conduct, most of the traditional-
ist arguments against a contractual theory of the duty of loyalty
apply with less force.37
B. Establishing the Existence of a Corporate Opportunity
In this Part, the four primary tests courts use to determine
whether an opportunity is a "corporate opportunity" will be ex-
amined. In most jurisdictions, courts will initially evaluate
whether a corporate opportunity existed by applying the test, or
an adaptation thereof, from the seminal Delaware case of Guth
v. Loft. 38 These "traditional" tests examine whether (1) the
claimed opportunity arose out of a preexisting right, interest or
expectancy of the business; (2) the opportunity was in the busi-
ness's line of business; or (3) the opportunity was of practical
advantage to the business.39
36. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 30, at 33, 35 (citations omitted).
37. See generally id. (providing a thorough critique of traditionalist argu-
ments that the market is unable to constrain unfaithful fiduciary conduct).
38. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
39. See id. at 511. At least one commentator, perhaps correctly, recognizes
that the traditional corporate opportunity tests are merely conclusions of law.
Corporate Opportunity in the Close Corporation-A Different Result?, supra note 9,
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Since 1939, however, when the Delaware Supreme Court
decided Guth, courts and commentators have modified (and in
some cases explicitly rejected) the Guth test to address various
factors that they felt were not adequately addressed by the
Guth court.40 For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court en-
gages in a two-step inquiry to determine first whether an oppor-
tunity was a corporate opportunity, and, second, whether the
opportunity was usurped by a fiduciary.41
In addition, in some modern cases, courts have embraced
the view of Professors Victor Brudney and Robert Clark who
have advocated for a strict view of the corporate opportunity
doctrine in order to enforce their concomitant strict view of the
duty of loyalty.42 In the same vein, the American Law Institute
also has promulgated principles of corporate governance detail-
ing its view of the corporate opportunity doctrine, which mirrors
in many ways the strict view advocated by Brudney and
Clark.43
Because the history and features of each test are essential
to understand why each is unsatisfactory, all of these tests are
thoroughly examined below. But because the "strict" tests focus
on a fiduciary's initial conduct-her conduct before taking an
opportunity-these tests give relatively short shrift to the ques-
tion whether the opportunity should even be categorized as one
that properly belongs to the business.
1. The Traditional Tests
Modem courts usually apply some variation of the test the
Delaware Supreme Court promulgated in Guth v. Loft.44 The
at 382 ("Aside from concealing the true determinants-the underlying fact pat-
terns-these conclusory tests have proved to be indistinguishable and
meaningless.").
40. See sources cited infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
41. See Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81 (Minn. 1974); see discussion infra
Part II.B.2.
42. See Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Op-
portunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 998, 1000 (1981); see discussion infra Part II.B.3.
43. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.05 (Am. Law. Inst. 1994)
[hereinafter ALI]. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
44. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). For a concise summary of the facts and reasoning
of Guth, see Chew, supra note 20, at 455-59 (describing Guth's "line of business"
test); Eric G. Orlinsky, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Interested Director
Transactions: A Framework for Analysis in an Attempt to Restore Predictability, 24
[Vol. 23:83
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Guth court concluded that a plaintiff45 might establish a corpo-
rate opportunity if it showed several factors to be present:
[Ihf there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business
opportunity which the corporation is financially able to under-
take, is, from its nature, in the line of... business and is of practi-
cal advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an interest
or a reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity,
the self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into con-
flict with that of his corporation, the law will not permit him to
seize the opportunity for himself.46
.The Guth court's formulation merged earlier corporate op-
portunity tests-the preexisting right and interest or expec-
tancy tests47 that focused on opportunities arising out of
preexisting corporate economic relationships-with a line of
DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 466-73 (1999); David J. Brown, Note, When Opportunity
Knocks: An Analysis of the Brudney and Clark and AL! Principles of Corporate
Governance Proposals for Deciding Corporate Opportunity Claims, 11 J. CORP. L.
255, 256-57 (1986).
45. In most cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish a fiduciary rela-
tionship and the existence of a corporate opportunity before the fiduciary is per-
mitted to defend his conduct. See Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 121 (Conn.
1997). If the plaintiff fails to establish the existence of a corporate opportunity, the
judicial inquiry ends and the fiduciary is not liable for taking the opportunity. See
id. The proposed statute follows this well-recognized practice, but increases the
burden on the fiduciary to establish his applicable defenses by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. See id.; see also infra Part III.
46. Guth, 5 A.2d at 511.
47. See Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 79-80 (Minn. 1974) (characterizing
the interest or expectancy test as "preclud[ing] acquisition by corporate of-
ficers . . . of a business opportunity in which the corporation has a 'beachhead' in
the sense of a legal or equitable interest or expectancy growing out of a preexisting
right or relationship"); see also United Seal & Rubber v. Bunting, 285 S.E.2d 721,
722 (Ga. 1982); Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 151 So. 161, 163 (Miss. 1933).
In Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 28 So. 199, 201 (Ala. 1900), the Alabama
Supreme Court clearly articulated the preexisting right/interest or expectancy
test: "[I]n general the legal restrictions which rest upon such officers in their acqui-
sitions are generally limited to property wherein the corporation has an interest
already existing, or in which it has an expectancy growing out of an existing
right .... " Id. (emphasis added). For a summary of the facts in Lagarde, see
Chew, supra note 20, at 459-60. The Alabama Supreme Court has subsequently
interpreted the language in Lagarde to be the equivalent of the broader Guth test.
See, e.g., Morad v. Coupounas, 361 So. 2d 6, 9 (Ala. 1978). Similarly, in Carper v.
Frost Oil Co., 211 P. 370 (Colo. 1922), the court cited then existing authority that
suggested that whether a corporate opportunity is established "depends upon
whether the corporation has an interest, actual or in expectancy," in the corporate
opportunity. Id. at 371. See generally Brown, supra note 44, at 262-63; Talley,
supra note 17, at 292-93.
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business/practical advantage inquiry.48 The line of business in-
quiry is perhaps Guth's broadest inquiry.49 An opportunity is in
a line of business if the opportunity is "so closely associated
with the existing business activities ... as to bring the transac-
tion within that class of cases where the acquisition of the [op-
portunity] would throw the corporate officer . . into
competition with his company. '50 The Guth court expanded on
this concept later in its opinion stating:
Where a corporation is engaged in a certain business, and an op-
portunity is presented to it embracing an activity as to which it
has fundamental knowledge, practical experience and ability to
pursue, which, logically and naturally, is adaptable to its busi-
ness .. .and is one that is consonant with its reasonable needs
and aspirations for expansion, it may be properly said that the
opportunity is in the line of the corporation's business.51
Other courts have nuanced the all-encompassing Guth test
by examining whether the opportunity was (1) within the
"avowed business purpose" of the business;52 (2) "reasonably in-
cident to its present or prospective operations";53 or (3) "so
48. See generally Orlinsky, supra note 44.
49. See Guth, 5 A.2d at 514 ("The phrase [line of business] is not within the
field of precise definition, nor is it one that can be bounded by a set formula. It has
a flexible meaning, which is to be applied reasonably and sensibly to the facts and
circumstances of the particular case."); Miller, 222 N.W.2d at 80 (recognizing that
the line of business test established in Guth is "more flexible in scope than the
restrictive 'interest or expectancy' test of earlier decisions").
50. Guth, 5 A.2d at 513; see also Note, Corporate Opportunity, supra note 9, at
769 ("The line of business apparently does not stop at the boundary of the corpora-
tion's current operations, but seems also to embrace areas into which the corpora-
tion might naturally or easily expand."). See generally Talley, supra note 17, at
289-92; James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Business Opportunities are in
"Line of Business" of Corporation for Purposes of Determining Whether a Corporate
Opportunity was Presented, 77 A.L.R.3d 961 (1977).
51. Guth, 5 A.2d at 514.
52. Ostrowski, 703 A.2d 117, 122 (Conn. 1997). The Ostrowski court stated
that "[t]he avowed business purpose test . . .is a variant of the 'line of business'
test." Id. at 123. The "test asks whether the opportunity is 'closely associated with
the existing and prospective activities of the corporation . . . .'" Id. (quoting Rosen-
blum v. Judson Eng'g Corp., 109 A.2d 558 (N.H. 1954)); see also Giulietti v. Giu-
lietti, 784 A.2d 905, 948 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) ("Pursuant to the avowed business
purpose test, the potential opportunity need not be identical to the corporation's
current activities. Only a 'close relationship' is required.").
53. Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Ass'n, 317 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ill. 1974); see also Brown,
supra note 44, at 258 ("A corporation's special competency in an area can be ex-
pected to extend beyond merely the existing operations. Corporations are dy-
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closely associated with the existing and prospective activities of
the corporation that the defendants should fairly have acquired
that business for or made it available to the corporation. '"5 4 In
addition, concepts of good or bad faith are usually not evaluated
in making an initial determination whether an opportunity was
corporate in nature.55
Courts and commentators have long criticized the Guth
test, especially its line of business inquiry, for its conceptual
ambiguity and potentially illogical results. 56 For instance, an
opportunity to purchase adjacent land may not be in the line of
business, or have anything to do with operating a golf course,
but it may still be "detrimental to the best interests of the
[c]lub"5 7 if the course plans to expand in the future.58 Other
courts have acknowledged the opposite result: the line of busi-
ness inquiry will conclusively establish a corporate opportunity
where one should not be found due to the relationship of the
parties involved. 59
Notwithstanding this judicial and academic criticism, the
Guth test is the most widely accepted test for establishing
whether an opportunity is a corporate opportunity under the
corporate opportunity doctrine, and, therefore, it anchors the
proposed statute's initial inquiry later in this Article.60
namic, evolving entities. To limit the definition of 'line of business' to a
corporation's existing [activities] is to deny this fact.").
54. Rosenblum, 109 A.2d at 563.
55. See, e.g., id. (stating that "bad faith is [not] essential to the establishment
of a duty on the officers and directors of a corporation in connection with business
opportunities which they have acquired for themselves"); Production Machine Co.
v. Howe, 99 N.E.2d 32, 36 (Mass. 1951) ("Breach of duty [can] be found although no
corruption, dishonesty, or bad faith was involved."); Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d
71, 82 (Minn. 1974).
56. See Chew, supra note 20, at 466 ("Because the traditional tests and the
eventual results are not consistent, these courts often cannot provide logical, well-
reasoned explanations for the results. They instead follow the routine of elabo-
rately stating the facts, citing the tests, and announcing their conclusion.").
57. Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me.
1995).
58. For a detailed discussion of Northeast Harbor Golf Club, see generally
Harvey Gelb, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine-Recent Cases and the Elusive
Goal of Clarity, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 371, 374-82 (1997).
59. See Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1967).
60. See infra Part III.
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2. The Miller "Two-Step"
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Miller v. Miller6' ap-
proached the challenge of corporate opportunity by establishing
a two-step inquiry.62 The Miller court's first inquiry determines
whether a business opportunity is a corporate opportunity, and
it is essentially a flexible application of Guth's line of business
inquiry. 63 According to the Miller court, several factors should
be examined:
Whether the business opportunity presented is one in which the
complaining corporation has an interest or an expectancy growing
out of an existing contractual right; the relationship of the oppor-
tunity to the corporation's business purposes and current activi-
ties-whether essential, necessary, or merely desirable to its
reasonable needs and aspirations-; whether, within or without
its corporate powers, the opportunity embraces areas adaptable to
its business and into which the corporation might easily, natu-
rally, or logically expand; the competitive nature of the opportu-
nity . . . and whether the opportunity includes activities as to
which the corporation has fundamental knowledge, practical ex-
perience, facilities, equipment, personnel, and the ability to
pursue. 64
Therefore, "[i]f the facts are undisputed that the business op-
portunity presented bears no logical or reasonable relation to
the existing or prospective business activities of the corpora-
tion . . . then such opportunity would have to be found to be
noncorporate as a matter of law."65 The Miller court's second
step examines the inherent fairness of the fiduciary's conduct
and will be examined below when fiduciary defenses are
discussed. 66
61. 222 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1974). For background on Miller, see Chew, supra
note 20, at 462-63.
62. See generally Orlinsky, supra note 44, at 458-59.
63. See Miller, 222 N.W.2d at 81.
64. Id. The ellipsis in the block quote omits language regarding the financial
ability of the business to exploit the opportunity. Id. This "factor" will be dis-
cussed during the evaluation of fiduciary defenses. See infra Section C of Part II.
65. Miller, 222 N.W.2d at 81.
66. See infra Section C of Part II.
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3. The Brudney and Clark Approach
Victor Brudney and Robert Clark essentially retain the
Guth test to establish whether an opportunity should be treated
as sufficiently "corporate," although they argue that public and
close corporations should be treated differently when evaluat-
ing corporate opportunity claims.67 They further distinguish
between full-time executives and outside directors/part-time ex-
ecutives in adopting their rules for evaluating corporate oppor-
tunity claims. 68
In the close corporation context:
(1) If the disputed opportunity is functionally related to the corpo-
ration's business, then, whether or not it is "necessary" or of"spe-
cial value," individual participants may not take it.
(2) If the corporation has an "interest" or "expectancy" in the op-
portunity, individual participants may not take it.69
Conceding that the "functionally related" test "will not offer
bright lines by which to decide particular cases,"70 they argue
that the concept "assumes that the manufacturing or sales
processes of the new project, or perhaps its resources, overlap
with the enterprise's existing business operations to produce
nontrivial synergistic gains" which could come from "comple-
mentary values.., parallel opportunities ... or the exploitation
of additional sources of natural resources or quantities of the
same product."71 Believing that this admittedly broad test will
not sufficiently deter fiduciaries from taking opportunities, they
place the burden of proving that the opportunity was not func-
67. See Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1000. In doing so, Brudney and
Clark use a selective approach for close corporations and a categorical approach for
public corporations. As later parts of this Article demonstrate, the distinction is
unnecessary because most corporate opportunity claims arise in the closely held
business context. Moreover, the likelihood that a full-time executive of a public
corporation would usurp a corporate opportunity from his corporation is likely
rather small. See infra Section A of Part IV. For a concise description of the Brud-
ney and Clark approach, see Brown, supra note 44, at 265-66.
68. See Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1000.
69. See id. at 1011; see also Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906, 916 (Or. 1985)
(referring to the close corporation test).
70. Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1012.
71. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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tionally related to the business on the fiduciary, absent receipt
of consent before the taking.72
Describing 'their second inquiry, Brudney and Clark opine
that "[t]he concept of an interest or expectancy.., is fundamen-
tally an extension of the concept of corporate property."73 They
then back off from this characterization, asserting that "an in-
terest or expectancy is not legally 'property,' even though it may
be economically capitalizable and of sufficient value to be sala-
ble in arm's-length transactions." 74 Unable to decide on a satis-
factory definition for their articulation of "interest or
expectancy," Brudney and Clark throw up their hands and con-
cede that "[tihe intrinsic ambiguity of the concept suggests, as
in the case of determining whether opportunities are function-
ally related, that the burden be placed on the challenged fiduci-
ary to prove the absence of an interest or expectancy."75
With respect to full-time executives in public corporations,
they adopt a categorical rule prohibiting the "taking [ofi any
other active business opportunity"76 and reason that such a rule
"would result in considerable social benefit at little, if any, so-
cial cost."77 Their definition of a corporate opportunity for a
public corporation is as broad as theoretically possible and "in-
clude[s] all possibilities of acquiring profitable businesses with
a rate of return and risk level no worse than that of its other
operations. "78
In sum, the Brudney and Clark approach for corporate op-
portunity mirrors, in many ways, the broad Guth inquiry; but it
presumptively places the burden of proving that the opportu-
72. Id. at 1013 ("Thus, unless the participant who takes an opportunity has
received such consent, either in advance or contemporaneously, the new project
should be presumed to be functionally related to the business of the corporation
and the diverter should have the burden of proving the contrary.").
73. Id. (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 1014. As Professor Kenneth Davis correctly recognizes, this is ex-
actly why the corporate opportunity doctrine exists: "If the party already had a
legally protected property interest, resort to the equitable strictures of the corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine would be unnecessary. Rather, the function of the corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine is to apply property-like protection where no
conventional property right exists." Davis, supra note 19, at 236.
75. Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1016.
76. Id. at 1023.
77. Id. at 1024.
78. Id. at 1025.
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nity was not corporate on the fiduciary, absent consent, in a
close corporation. It also categorically prohibits full-time execu-
tives of public corporations from taking any profitable opportu-
nities they encounter during their employment.
4. The American Law Institute Approach
The American Law Institute ("ALI") approach to corporate
opportunity, promulgated in 1994, 79 also borrows substantially
from the Guth test.8 0 The principal feature of the ALI test is its
strict requirement that the fiduciary disclose a potential corpo-
rate opportunity to his business.8 ' Under the ALI test's general
rule, "[a] director or senior executive may not take advantage of
a corporate opportunity unless: (1) The director or senior execu-
tive first offers the corporate opportunity to the corporation and
makes disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the cor-
porate opportunity; [and] (2) The corporate opportunity is re-
jected by the corporation . "8... 2 Further, the rejection must
satisfy several conditions:
(A) The rejection of the opportunity [must be] fair to the
corporation;
(B) The opportunity [must be] rejected in advance, following
such disclosure, by disinterested directors, or, in the case of
a senior executive who is not a director, by a disinterested
superior, in a manner that satisfies the standards of the bus-
iness judgment rule; or
(C) The rejection [must be] authorized in advance or ratified, fol-
lowing such disclosure, by disinterested shareholders, and
the rejection [must not be] equivalent to a waste of corporate
assets.8
3
Under the ALI test, the party challenging the taking of an
opportunity has the initial burden of proving the existence of
the corporate opportunity. 4 A corporate opportunity is an op-
79. ALI, supra note 43, § 5.05.
80. For a description and critique of the ALI test, see Brown, supra note 44, at
267-68. See generally THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF COR-
PORATE DIRECTORS 305-08 (Dennis J. Block et al. eds., 1998) (discussing the ALI
test).
81. ALI, supra note 43, § 5.05(a)(1).
82. Id. § 5.05(a)(1)-(2).
83. Id. § 5.05(a)(3).
84. Id. § 5.05(c).
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portunity that a director or senior executive encounters "[iin
connection with the performance of functions as a director or
senior executive, or under circumstances that should reasona-
bly lead the director or senior executive to believe that the per-
son offering the opportunity expects it to be offered to the
corporation . . . ., Furthermore, a corporate opportunity also
can be established if "[through the use of corporate information
or property,... the resulting opportunity is one that the direc-
tor or senior executive should reasonably be expected to believe
would be of interest to the corporation; or ... is closely related
to a business in which the corporation is engaged or expects to
engage."8 6
On its face, the ALI test adds nothing to the traditional
tests (other than its strict disclosure requirement) although the
clause "reasonably be expected to believe would be of interest to
the corporation" seems to encompass any potentially profitable
business opportunity.8 7 Indeed, the comments to the ALI rec-
ommendation contemplate this observation.88 Overall, ALI
sought to establish "a more flexible standard for application to
particular cases, because it does not limit the doctrine's applica-
bility to a particular 'line of business,' and applies the doctrine
to a contemplated activity in which the corporation may subse-
quently engage."8 9 Although the ALI test does not explicitly ref-
erence the interest or expectancy test, the comments make clear
that ALI also sought to incorporate that test in its
recommendation. 90
C. Fiduciary Defenses to Corporate Opportunity Claims
Although a fiduciary may assert several defenses in re-
sponse to corporate opportunity claims, five primary defenses
have been recognized and, in some jurisdictions, explicitly re-
jected. Fiduciaries may claim that they should be absolved
from liability under the corporate opportunity doctrine because
85. Id. § 5.05(b)(1)(A).
86. ALI, supra note 43, § 5.05(b)(1)(B)-(2).
87. Id. § 5.05(b)(1)(B).
88. Id. § 5.05(b) cmt. b(2) ("Section 5.05(b)(2) expands the scope of corporate
opportunity beyond the concept of an existing 'line of business,' . . . to cover an
existing or contemplated activity of the corporation .. .
89. Id.
90. Id.
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(1) the business consented to a taking, either in individual
cases, or categorically through ex ante blanket consent;91 (2) the
taking of the opportunity was fair to the business;92 (3) the busi-
ness was legally unable to exploit the opportunity when it was
presented, or a third party refused to deal with the fiduciary's
business;93 (4) the business was financially unable to exploit the
opportunity when it was presented to the fiduciary; 94 or (5) the
opportunity was presented to the fiduciary in his individual, as
opposed to his official/corporate capacity. 95
1. Individual and Blanket Consent by the Business
Every corporate opportunity test, except perhaps the Brud-
ney and Clark approach, permits a business to consent individ-
ually to a fiduciary's taking of an opportunity. Most tests,
however, require that consent be given by disinterested deci-
sionmakers-either the board of directors (or similar body) or
the shareholders-for the consent to be effective. 96
Although the Guth court did not mention consent as a pos-
sible fiduciary defense, courts applying the reasoning of Guth
have consistently recognized that ex ante consent absolves a fi-
duciary from liability under the corporate opportunity doc-
trine.97 Courts, however, have consistently held that consent
must be given by a disinterested group of decisionmakers, much
like the similar requirement in the area of corporate self-deal-
ing.98 Therefore, "'[ilf the opportunity is rejected by the corpo-
ration, at least by a disinterested vote of the board of directors
91. See infra note 96-118 and accompanying text.
92. See infra note 119-33 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 143-64 and accompanying text.
95. See infra note 165-70 and accompanying text.
96. See supra Section B of Part II.
97. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996)
(stating that "presenting the opportunity to the board creates a kind of 'safe har-
bor' for the director, which removes the specter of a post hoc judicial determination
that the director or officer has improperly usurped a corporate opportunity");
Schildberg Rock Products Co. v. Brooks, 140 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Iowa 1966) ("Where
a corporation ... declines [an opportunity] an officer or director may embrace [that
opportunity] as his own without accounting to the corporation.") Chem. Dynamics,
Inc. v. Newfeld, 728 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that a fiduciary
may take a corporate opportunity if "that opportunity is first offered to the
corporation").
98. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 125 (Conn. 1997).
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after full disclosure, the opportunity usually ceases to be a cor-
porate opportunity."' 99 Other courts have added the require-
ment that the consent not be "'detrimental to the creditors of
the corporation." ' 100 Finally, effective consent may be implied
from the circumstances if an opportunity is presented to a busi-
ness and not taken advantage of over a period of time, 101 al-
though this also could be characterized as ex post ratification. 10 2
The Miller court, in its two-step approach to corporate op-
portunity claims, also recognized a consent defense. As part of
its fairness inquiry, the court stated that one significant factor a
court should consider is "prior disclosure of the opportunity to
the board of directors or shareholders and their response."0 3
The Miller court did not, however, elaborate on why consent ab-
solves a fiduciary from liability under the doctrine.
Contrary to both the traditional tests and the Miller two-
step approach, Brudney and Clark diverge and plainly permit a
consent defense in the close corporation context; whereas they
categorically eliminate the defense in the case of public corpora-
tions. According to Brudney and Clark, in the close corporation
context "only express contemporaneous consent should permit a
diversion that would otherwise be unlawful." 0 4 Absent express,
contemporaneous consent, "the burden should be on the di-
verter to prove for other opportunities that the particular diver-
sion was originally consented to by the founding venturers." 05
99. Id. (citation omitted); see also Note, Corporate Opportunity, supra note 9,
at 773.
100. See, e.g., CST, Inc. v. Mark, 520 A.2d 469, 471 (Pa. 1987) (recognizing
that a fiduciary may take an opportunity "'if the same is made known to the share-
holders, who consent to the acquisition of the opportunity by the individual officer
or director instead of the corporation, and such action is not detrimental to the
creditors of the corporation'" (quoting Hill v. Hill, 420 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980))).
101. See Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 573 (Md. 1978) (conclud-
ing that the business's "procrastination and intransigence amounted to no less
than an abandonment of whatever corporate opportunity might have existed").
102. See, e.g., Canion v. Tex. Cycle Supply, Inc., 537 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976) (noting that "where the actions or transactions of directors of a
corporation are involved, and the claim is made that the directors are personally
interested, such action or transaction may be ratified by a vote or acquiescence of
all, or a majority, of the stockholders").
103. Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 82 (Minn. 1974).
104. Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1019.
105. Id.
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But they do not offer any guide to assist a fiduciary to demon-
strate implied consent.
In the public corporation context, they begin by asserting
that "consent to [an] officer's taking [of] a corporate opportunity
approaches the kind of waste for which unanimous stockholder
approval is traditionally required"10 6 and "the adequacy of any
feasible procedure to effect such consent [is doubtful] ."107 Even
if the decisionmakers are formally disinterested, according to
Brudney and Clark, consent will not be "adequately informed
and impartial" because "[t]he consent of fellow officers may well
suffer from lack of objectivity; the consent of stockholders, from
lack of knowledge; and the consent of outside directors, from
lack of proper incentives." 08 Because of these significant
problems with ex ante consent, Brudney and Clark conclude
that "[tihe absence of any compelling reasons to permit 'proper'
diversions emphasizes the pointlessness of incurring such a
cost."10 9
Nevertheless, Brudney and Clark recognize that a jurisdic-
tion may wish to recognize a consent defense. In this situation,
they argue "the test of such consent should be realistic."110 The
corporation must give
notice of each opportunity [to the shareholders], stating explicitly
its estimated value or potential and why the corporation has de-
cided to reject it and permit the officers to take it. And approval
by stockholders or disinterested directors should not preclude de
novo judicial assessment of the transaction, at least in measuring
the appropriating executive's responsibility; the "business judg-
ment" defense should not be permitted to shield the arrangement
from meaningful judicial scrutiny."'
The ALI test also provides for a consent defense, in line
with the traditional tests and Miller two-step approach. 112 Sec-
tion 5.05(a) provides that a fiduciary may take a corporate op-
portunity if he first discloses the opportunity and either "[t]he
opportunity is rejected in advance, following such disclosure, by
106. Id. at 1033.
107. Id. at 1034.
108. Id. at 1034 (footnotes omitted).
109. Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1035.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1035-36 (footnote omitted).
112. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 44, at 268-70.
109
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disinterested directors, or, in the case of a senior executive who
is not a director, by a disinterested superior, in a manner that
satisfies the standards of the business judgment rule .... -113 A
business also may properly reject an opportunity if "[tihe rejec-
tion is authorized in advance or ratified, following such disclo-
sure, by disinterested shareholders, and the rejection is not
equivalent to a waste of corporate assets."114 The comment to
section 5.05(a) also makes clear that a "[flailure [of a corpora-
tion] to accept the opportunity within a reasonable time will be
considered tantamount to a rejection.""15 Therefore, the ALI
test accepts the "failure to reject as implied consent" defense,
which has been adopted by some of the traditional test courts.
The propriety of permitting a business to give "blanket con-
sent" to the taking of a range of corporate opportunities in its
articles of incorporation, or similar instrument, is less accepted
as a defense to corporate opportunity claims. There has been,
however, a trend towards recognizing this defense. In 2000, the
Delaware State Legislature adopted Senate Bill No. 363.116
Section three of the bill amended section 122, title eight of the
Delaware Code by adding a subsection seventeen. Subsection
seventeen now permits a corporation to
[r]enounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its
board of directors, any interest or expectancy of the corporation
in, or in being offered an opportunity to participate in, specified
business opportunities or specified classes or categories of busi-
ness opportunities that are presented to the corporation or one or
more of its officers, directors or stockholders.1 17
113. ALI, supra note 43, § 5.05(a)(3)(B).
114. Id. § 5.05(a)(3)(C).
115. Id. § 5.05(a) cmt.
116. Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General Cor-
poration Law, ch. 343, § 3, 72 Del. Laws 619 (2000). The session law can be found
in Westlaw at DE LEGIS 343 (2000).
117. Id. ch. 343, § 3. The synopsis of the senate bill noted that the
amendment
is intended to eliminate uncertainty regarding the power of a corporation to
renounce corporate opportunities in advance .... It permits the corporation
to determine in advance whether a specified business opportunity or class or
category of business opportunities is a corporate opportunity of the corpora-
tion rather than to address such opportunities as they arise. The subsection
does not change the level of judicial scrutiny that will apply to the renuncia-
tion of an interest or expectancy of the corporation in a business opportu-
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The practical effect of this new subsection likely means that a
Delaware corporation may expressly designate ex ante what cor-
porate opportunities it is not interested in exploiting. This pro-
vision, therefore, may result in more predictability for
fiduciaries, who are contemplating taking a business opportu-
nity, when they feel that the opportunity might properly belong
to their corporation. 118
2. Fairness
Although the concept of fairness is intertwined with any
corporate opportunity analysis, many courts merge their corpo-
rate opportunity approach into one solitary question: whether
the fiduciary's conduct was fair to the business.119 Predictably,
consistent application of the fairness test/defense has never
been achieved. 20
nity, which will be determined based on the common law of fiduciary duty,
including the duty of loyalty.
S.B. 363, 140th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2000). The statute was amended
apparently in response to the uncertainties created by the Delaware Court of
Chancery in Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 218 (1989). In
Siegman, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim that an
amendment to Tri-Star's certificate of incorporation, required as part of a potential
combination with Coca-Cola, unlawfully eliminated or limited the duty of loyalty
for Tri-Star's directors who also were going to be directors of Coca-Cola or Time
(another constituent organization to the combination) as a result of the combina-
tion. See generally id. The Delaware statute at the time, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8
§ 102(b)(7) (1971), provided that the duty of loyalty could not be eliminated or lim-
ited in articles of incorporation. Id. at 235. Because the court determined that the
proposed amendment to Tri-Star's articles of incorporation, which provided the cir-
cumstances where corporate opportunities would be allocated to Tri-Star, or, in the
alternative, to Coca-Cola and Time, may have violated the statute's clear prohibi-
tions, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. See id. at 235-36.
118. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate
America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to
Kahan & Kamar's Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1257, 1270 n.66 (2001) (stating that the "amendment will enable cor-
porations to better avoid corporate-opportunity claims against their directors and
officers, as exposure to such claims has been a concern among directors of firms in
the high-technology sector").
119. See, e.g., Haseotes v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 257 B.R. 691, 694-95 (D.
Mass 2001); Orlinsky, supra note 44, at 460-61. Orlinsky notes that "fairness only
plays a small role in determining whether a corporate opportunity exists in the
first place." Orlinsky, supra note 44, at 463. See generally Annotation, Fairness to
Corporation Where "Corporate Opportunity" is Allegedly Usurped by Officer or Di-
rector, 17 A.L.R.4th 479 (1982).
120. See Talley, supra note 17, at 293-95.
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A classic statement of the fairness test/defense was articu-
lated in Durfee v. Durfee.121 The court concluded:
that the true basis of the [corporate opportunity] doctrine rests
fundamentally on the unfairness in the particular circumstances
of a director, whose relation to the corporation is fiduciary, taking
advantage of an opportunity [for his personal profit] when the in-
terest of the corporation justly call [sic] for protection. This calls
for the application of ethical standards of what is fair and
equitable .... 122
Therefore, "[tihe linchpin of the rule and the exceptions is
fairness and reasonableness to the corporation. . . . [Conse-
quently], the burden is on the interested parties to demonstrate
the fairness and reasonableness of the transaction. That deter-
mination is largely a question of fact to be determined from the
objective facts and surrounding circumstances existing at the
time the opportunity arises."123
121. 80 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 1948). For a general discussion of the fairness de-
fense and Durfee, see Chew, supra note 20, at 461-62.
122. Durfee, 80 N.E.2d at 529 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (second
alteration in original). Accord Paulman v. Kritzer, 219 N.E.2d 541, 546-47 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1966). It is unclear whether the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
has abandoned the fairness test/defense in favor of strict disclosure. See Demoulas
v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 183 (Mass. 1997) (stating that
"nondisclosure of a corporate opportunity is, in itself, unfair to a corporation and a
breach of fiduciary duty"); id. at 182 (stating that "to meet a fiduciary's duty of
loyalty, a director or officer who wishes to take advantage of a corporate opportu-
nity.., must first disclose material details of the venture to the corporation"). See
generally In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 284 F.3d 216, 227 (1st Cir. 2002) (discuss-
ing and applying Demoulas). Indeed, at least the First Circuit has recognized that
Massachusetts may now be a strict-disclosure state. Id. at 229-31.
123. Indep. Distributors, Inc. v. Katz, 637 A.2d 886, 894 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Weiss v. Kay Jewelry
Stores, Inc., 470 F.2d 1259, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying Delaware law); Boyd v.
Howard, 556 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (six factor test to determine
whether a corporate opportunity has been usurped). Accord Burg v. Horn, 380
F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1967). The Burg court concluded that the proper inquiry
was whether "'in any particular case, . . . [there are] circumstances that would
make it unfair for [the fiduciary] to take the opportunity for himself."' Id. (quoting
Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 924 (Del. Ch. 1956)). The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals recently acknowledged that the quoted language in the text from
Katz resulted in confusion over what constituted the test for corporate opportunity
claims in Maryland. See Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270, 278 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2000). The Shapiro court, however, failed to reconsider the test after discuss-
ing its inherent shortcomings. Id.
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The Miller court's second step is a clear and well-articu-
lated example of the fairness test/defense. 124 The Miller court
concluded that if
the opportunity is found to be a corporate one, liability should not
be imposed upon the acquiring officer if the evidence establishes
that his acquisition did not violate his fiduciary duties of loyalty,
good faith, and fair dealing toward the corporation. Thus,.... the
ultimate question of liability involves close scrutiny of the equita-
ble considerations existing prior to, at the time of, and following
the officer's acquisition. 125
The court then outlined some examples of relevant considera-
tions applicable to such an inquiry:
Significant factors which should be considered are the nature of
the officer's relationship to the management and control of the
corporation; whether the opportunity was presented to him in his
official or individual capacity; his prior disclosure of the opportu-
nity to the board of directors or shareholders and their response;
whether or not he used or exploited corporate facilities, assets, or
personnel in acquiring the opportunity; whether his acquisition
harmed... the corporation; and all other facts and circumstances
bearing on the officer's good faith and whether he exercised the dil-
igence, devotion, care, and fairness toward the corporation which
ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circum-
stances in like positions.126
Therefore, "[t]he Miller test differs from the other tradi-
tional tests in a fundamental way; it does not presume the fidu-
ciaries' use of an opportunity deemed to belong to the
corporation automatically results in a breach of duty."1 27 More-
over, the last clause, emphasized above, seems to permit a Min-
nesota court to examine any evidence of fiduciary conduct to
arrive at its legal conclusion. It is this hopelessly open-ended
inquiry that is rejected later in this Article. 128
Brudney and Clark reject the fairness defense and argue
that the "concept [has] no principled content and seems de-
signed to leave the courts with boundless discretion"; conse-
124. See generally Brown, supra note 44, at 259-60.
125. Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81 (Minn. 1974); see also Southeast Con-
sultants v. McCrary Eng'g Corp., 273 S.E.2d 112, 117 (Ga. 1980).
126. Miller, 222 N.W.2d at 81-82 (emphasis added).
127. Chew, supra note 20, at 463.
128. See infra Section D of Part IV.
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quently, the defense "generates much uncertainty about the
operational meaning of the legal rule, but no offsetting bene-
fits."1 29 The ALI test, however, retains a somewhat confusing
application of the fairness test/defense; it permits the defense
when a corporate opportunity is presented to the corporation,
after full disclosure, and is rejected by the corporation by inter-
ested directors or shareholders. 130 To put it another way, it per-
mits a fairness defense where there is a "defective" rejection. 13'
Although the ALI fairness inquiry seems to be open-ended, one
court has suggested that an ALI fairness inquiry "includes con-
sideration of whether the corporation was financially or other-
wise incapacitated from undertaking the corporate
opportunity."132
In sum, although the fairness defense is still recognized in
several jurisdictions, its underlying rationale and usefulness is
questionable in light of its propensity to create uncertainty for
fiduciaries and courts alike. 133
3. Legal Inability, Technical Inability & Third Party
Refusals to Deal
The legal inability defense is easy to understand; but, as
with the financial inability defense discussed below, is not uni-
formly recognized by courts. This defense is commonly asserted
where a fiduciary believed that her business was precluded
from taking an opportunity by restrictions in its corporate char-
129. Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1020.
130. See ALI, supra note 43, § 5.05(a)(3)(A); see also Northeast Harbor Golf
Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1151-52 (Me. 1995).
If the Club shows that the board did not reject the opportunity by a vote of
the disinterested directors after full disclosure, then Harris may defend her
actions on the basis that the taking of the opportunity was fair to the corpo-
ration. If Harris failed to offer the opportunity at all, however, then she
may not defend on the basis that the failure to offer the opportunity was
fair.
Harris, 661 A.2d at 1151-52 (citation omitted).
131. The comment to § 5.05 mentions, but does not elaborate on, why ALI
decided to retain a fairness defense. According to the comment, if there is no disin-
terested rejection of the corporate opportunity under § 5.05(a)(3)(B)-(C), "the bur-
den of proving fairness [is placed] on the director or senior executive." ALI, supra
note 43, § 5.05 cmt. a.
132. Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906, 919 (Or. 1985).
133. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 44, at 259 ("The amorphous nature of the
fairness test results in uncertainty in application and unpredictability of result.").
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ter or by operation of law. 34 Some courts have rejected the le-
gal inability defense on the theory that the business should be
notified of the opportunity and be afforded the right to reject the
opportunity even if it is initially unable to legally exploit it. 13
In addition to the legal inability defense, at least one court has
recognized a technical inability defense where it found that the
practical ability of the corporation to take the opportunity was
foreclosed by its "critical space problem." 136
Other courts have recognized that liability under the corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine should not be found if the fiduciary
shows that a third party who offered the opportunity to the fi-
duciary initially refused to deal with the business. In New v.
New, 37 the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors approached a fi-
duciary of an oil company and "told him in no uncertain terms
that a lease would not be given" to the fiduciary's company "and
that if [the fiduciary] wanted it [he] would have to take it in
person or through another corporation." 38 The court deter-
mined that although the corporation had the initial ability to
block the project, "the power to negate the enjoyment of a busi-
ness opportunity ... does not constitute the kind of an expec-
tancy which lies at the basis of the corporate opportunity
doctrine."139
Other courts have concluded that although a third party re-
fusal to deal defense is commonly asserted, it should not be rec-
134. See Chew, supra note 20, at 471-72; Brown, supra note 44, at 264.
135. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Ass'n, 317 N.E.2d 39, 44 (Ill. 1974).
136. Robinson v. Brier, 194 A.2d 204, 206 (Pa. 1963); see also Chew, supra
note 20, at 473-74 (describing the business-practicality defense). Professor Chew
describes an analogous "business-practicality" defense when describing a "Corpo-
rate Capability Model." Chew, supra note 20, at 473-74. Within this model, the
defenses of legal inability, financial inability, business practicality, and third party
refusals to deal are recognized. Discussing "business practicality," she notes that
such a test that "evaluates realistic business and market constraints, along with
the opportunity's financial feasibility and return on investment, more accurately
reflects actual corporate decision making." Id. at 474. She concedes, however, that
"[tihe courts nevertheless generally have rejected this analysis, presumably be-
cause of traditional judicial hesitation to speculate on management decisions and
corporate strategy." Id.
137. 306 P.2d 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
138. Id. at 996.
139. Id. at 996-97; cf Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 151 So. 161, 163
(Miss. 1933) ("After the corporation has refused or failed to obtain a contract with
a third person he is not precluded from contracting in his own behalf with such
third person.").
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ognized unless the opportunity has been fully disclosed to the
business. 140 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts has stated
this view succinctly:
[T]he unalterability of [a third party's] resolve can by no means be
certain so long as [a fiduciary], by keeping [the third party's] posi-
tion and his reasons for it a secret, never afforded [his company] a
chance to test it. If the refusal to deal is shrouded in secrecy, it is
too likely that the tempted officer will find himself in the position
of Fielding's "fair creature" of whom he wrote, "[Hie would have
ravished her, if she had not, by a timely compliance, prevented
him.' 4 '
Therefore, under this view, before a third party's refusal to deal
becomes a legitimate defense, the fiduciary "must unambigu-
ously disclose that refusal to the corporation to which he owes a
duty, together with a fair statement of the reasons for that
refusal."
142
4. Financial Inability
Perhaps the most controversial defense to a corporate op-
portunity claim is the financial inability defense. 143 Most courts
will evaluate the business's financial position at the time the
corporate opportunity arose.144 If, at that time, the business is
financially unable to take the opportunity, the fiduciary is per-
mitted to take the opportunity and is not liable under the corpo-
140. See Chew, supra note 20, at 474-76 (describing cases accepting and re-
jecting the third party refusal to deal defense).
141. Energy Res. Corp. v. Porter, 438 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982)
(quoting HENRY FIELDING, JONATHAN WILD 102 (Everyman's Library ed. 1964))
(sixth alteration in original).
142. Id.; see also Kelly v. 74 & 76 W. Tremont Ave. Corp., 151 N.Y.S.2d 900
(1956).
143. See generally Annotation, Financial Inability of Corporation to Take Ad-
vantage of Business Opportunity as Affecting Determination Whether "Corporate
Opportunity" Was Presented, 16 A.L.R.4th 185 (1982).
144. See Orlinsky, supra note 44, at 461-62. See, e.g., Morad v. Coupounas,
361 So. 2d 6, 9 (Ala. 1978) ("[O]ne of the factors to be considered by the trial court
is the corporation's financial ability to undertake the new enterprise, although fi-
nancial ability must be carefully considered and will not necessarily be determina-
tive."); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 156 (Del. 1996) (noting that
the fiduciary "was required to consider the facts only as they existed at the time he
determined to accept" the opportunity and exploit it); Fliegler v. Lawrence, No.
3647, 1974 WL 2037, *7 (Del. Ch. 1974).
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rate opportunity doctrine. 145  Other courts, and a few
commentators, do not recognize the financial inability defense
because of its actual or perceived tendency to foster fiduciary
disloyalty.
The Guth court implicitly recognized a financial inability
defense in its definition of a corporate opportunity. The court
stated that it is a prerequisite that the opportunity be one
which "the corporation is financially able to undertake"'146 and
found that plaintiff Loft had the financial ability to finance the
project.147 Courts that recognize a financial inability defense
seem to be concerned with creating bright line rules that would
prevent fiduciaries from exploiting profitable opportunities that
are simply not within the financial ability of their businesses.
One court illustrates this concern:
[Tihe corporation, while still maintaining its corporate existence,
had clearly failed in its purposes, not only so, but it was wholly
insolvent, and for some time prior to the [usurpation of the oppor-
tunity] had ceased even in an attempt to actively prosecute its
business. We see no good reason why the officers and directors of
such a corporation should be denied the right to make advanta-
geous trades for themselves, when, in so doing, the interests of the
insolvent, practically defunct, corporation, which they repre-
sented, are in no wise prejudiced thereby.' 48
145. See generally Chew, supra note 20, at 472-73; Michael Begert, Comment,
The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Outside Business Interests, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 827, 833-34 (1989).
146. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939); see also Kelegian v.
Mgrdichian, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("In addition the courts
may also consider whether the corporation has the financial resources to take ad-
vantage of a particular business opportunity."); Broz, 673 A.2d at 155; Parks v.
Multimedia Tech., 520 S.E.2d 517, 524 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Schildberg Rock Prod.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 140 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Iowa 1966); cf. Forkin v. Cole, 548 N.E.2d
795, 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (implicitly recognizing the defense); Chem. Dynamic,
Inc. v. Newfeld, 728 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (implicitly recognizing
the defense).
147. Guth, 5 A.2d at 513.
148. Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 153 S.W. 50, 54 (Ky. 1913). Compare a
more recent case where the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did
not usurp a corporate opportunity because the "corporation was financially unable
to avail itself of the opportunity," the defendant "then, as anyone, was able to par-
ticipate in its acquisition." A. Teixeira & Co., Inc. v. Teixeira, 699 A.2d 1383, 1388
(R.I. 1997).
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The burden of proving financial inability, however, is usu-
ally either implicitly or explicitly placed on the fiduciary.149
Other courts have only recognized the defense if the fiduciary
first disclosed the opportunity to the business. 150 The specific
indicators of financial ability, or conversely financial inability,
are not precisely articulated in the case law. But some courts
require that the business be insolvent, rather than merely fi-
nancially distressed.' 5 ' The difference between technical insol-
vency and financial inability, however, may be a distinction
without a difference. 152
The Miller court, in its two-step inquiry, also evaluated fi-
nancial ability in determining whether a fiduciary improperly
149. See Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 123 n.9 (Conn. 1997) ("[It is the
corporate fiduciary, not the complainant, who must establish, as an affirmative
defense, that the corporation lacked the financial ability to avail itself of a corpo-
rate opportunity."); Canion v. Tex. Cycle Supply, Inc., 537 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1976). The Guth court did not explicitly articulate which party has the
burden of proving financial ability or inability; it merely concluded that the corpo-
ration's "resources were found to be sufficient, for Guth made use of no other to any
important extent." Guth, 5 A.2d at 513. Therefore, "[t]he language in Guth [may]
impl[y] that financial ability to undertake a corporate opportunity is not only rele-
vant, but perhaps a condition precedent to the existence of a corporate opportu-
nity." Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906, 914 (Or. 1985); see also Elizey v. Fyr-
Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328, 1335 (Miss. 1979) (holding that a complainant business
must first show that the "business opportunity is logically related to the corpora-
tion's existing or prospective activities" and also must "prove that the corporation
was either (a) not insolvent in the balance sheet sense at the relevant times, or (b)
financially disabled as a result of nonpayment of a debt or breach of a fiduciary
duty by one or more of the defendants").
150. Lussier v. Mau-Van Develop., Inc., 667 P.2d 804, 813 (Haw. Ct. App.
1983).
151. See, e.g., CST, Inc. v. Mark, 520 A.2d 469, 472 (Pa. 1987) (stating that
there "was no evidence that [the corporation] was near insolvency or that it could
not have produced the funds necessary" to exploit the opportunity); Nicholson v.
Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 731 (Utah 1982) (noting that "corporate financial difficulty
short of actual insolvency as defined above is inadequate by itself to exonerate a
fiduciary who appropriates an opportunity").
152. See Plas-Tex, Inc. v. Jones, No. 03-99-00286-CV, 2000 WL 632677, at *6
(Tex. Ct. App. May 18, 2000) (noting that the corporation was "insolvent, [and] in
default" and therefore, "[g]iven its dire financial condition," was unable to take
advantage of the opportunity); see also Paulman v. Kritzer, 219 N.E.2d 541, 547
(Ill. App. Ct. 1966); Elec. Dev. Co. v. Robson, 28 N.W.2d 130, 138 (Neb. 1947) ("Fi-
nancial inability, unless it amounts to insolvency to the point where the corpora-
tion is practically or actually defunct, is insufficient to warrant application of the
[defense]."); Orlinsky, supra note 44, at 462 ("Unfortunately, whether the corpora-
tion is financially able to undertake the opportunity may be a difficult, subjective
determination that ultimately may be made by a judge after the fact.").
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took a corporate opportunity. The court, however, placed the
burden of proving financial ability on the business. In doing so,
the court asked "whether the corporation, by reason of insol-
vency or lack of resources, has the financial ability to acquire
the opportunity" and concluded that if "it lacks .. .the finan-
cial.., ability to pursue it, then such opportunity would have to
be found to be noncorporate as a matter of law." 153 If financial
ability is disputed, "the question is one of fact with the burden
of proof resting upon the party attacking the acquisition," or, in
other words, the business must show financial ability.154
Other courts have explicitly rejected the financial inability
defense. These courts generally believe that "the injection of fi-
nancial ability into the equation will unduly favor the inside di-
rector or executive who has command of the facts relating to the
finances of the corporation" and that the defense "will also act
as a disincentive to corporate executives to solve corporate fi-
nancing and other problems." 15 5 These courts seem to embrace
a presumptive fear that fiduciaries will not exert their best ef-
forts to improve their business's financial condition. The Sec-
ond Circuit's language in Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch illustrates
this fear and reinforces the courts' role in policing fiduciary
conduct:
If the directors are uncertain whether the corporation can make
the necessary outlays, they need not embark it upon the venture;
if they do, they may not substitute themselves for the corporation
any place along the line and divert possible benefits into their
own pockets. "Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undi-
153. Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81 (Minn. 1974). Accord A.C. Petters Co.
v. St. Cloud Enter., Inc., 222 N.W.2d 83, 86-87 (Minn. 1974).
154. Miller, 222 N.W.2d at 81.
155. Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me.
1995). Accord Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934) ("If
directors are permitted to justify their conduct on [a financial inability] theory,
there will be a temptation to refrain from exerting their strongest efforts on behalf
of the corporation since, if it does not meet the obligations, an opportunity of profit
will be open to them personally."); Kerrigan v. Unity Say. Ass'n, 317 N.E.2d 39, 44
(Ill. 1974) (relying on the language in Irving Trust); Durfee v. Durfee, 80 N.E.2d
522, 530 (Mass. 1948) (relying on the language in Irving Trust); see also Note, Cor-
porate Opportunity, supra note 9, at 772-73. See generally Brown, supra note 44,
at 263 (describing Irving Trust as an example of the strict view that financial in-
ability "is not a defense to a corporate opportunity claim").
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vided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular
exceptions."1 5
6
Finally, at least one court has determined that when apply-
ing the ALI test, financial inability may be examined to deter-
mine whether an interested rejection was fair. 157 Under this
view, if a fiduciary properly and fully discloses an opportunity
to the appropriate decisionmaker, but it is later determined
that the decisionmaker was not disinterested, financial inabil-
ity may absolve the fiduciary of liability because the transaction
was "fair" to the business. 15 The ALI test and its corresponding
comments, however, do not explicitly recognize financial inabil-
ity as a defense in the absence of proper disclosure to the
business.
Brudney and Clark lodge perhaps the strongest argument
against the financial inability defense in proposing their unique
corporate opportunity test. Brudney and Clark, contrary to the
argument presented below in favor of the defense, argue that in
the close corporation context "if financial disabilities ... are ac-
cepted as tests, the inevitable result will be to permit the diver-
sion" of the opportunity. 159 In turn, they agree with some
traditional test courts that financial inability will be hard to
prove after the fiduciary takes the opportunity because the
"facts [are] largely within the control of the diverter." 60 They
conclude, therefore, that "[t]o permit claims of disability to be-
come the subject of judicial controversy when they can only be
disproven by outsiders with great difficulty and at considerable
expense is to tempt participants to actions whose impropriety is
visible but rarely subject to effective challenge." 16' But they
seemingly retreat from this argument later in their article, and
recognize that "[tihe argument against the defense of incapacity
or disability may be less forceful for close corporations than for
public corporations because of the greater familiarity of the par-
ticipants with the affairs of the firm, their better access to rele-
156. Irving Trust Co., 73 F.2d at 124 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)); see also Paulman v. Kritzer, 219 N.E.2d 541, 545 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1966) (relying on Irving Trust in rejecting the financial inability defense).
157. Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906, 919 (Or. 1985).
158. Id. at 920.
159. Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1021.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1022.
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vant information, and the relative manageability of the
problems."162
In the case of public corporations, Brudney and Clark argue
that "the defense of corporate incapacity is, if anything, even
less tenable ... than it is in close corporation cases."1 63 This is
because the defense "inevitably depends on self-serving mana-
gerial claims that there exists no viable way to overcome the
stated corporate disability; and it is virtually impossible for
public stockholders to negate such claims."164
In sum, although courts and commentators are split re-
garding whether financial ability is a legitimate defense to a
corporate opportunity claim, there seems to be a trend toward
recognizing the defense.
5. Individual Capacity
The individual capacity defense is one of the longstanding
recognized defenses to corporate opportunity claims; however,
in modern cases its logic has been questioned, and the defense
is rejected below. The defense simply asserts that a fiduciary
should be able to exploit an opportunity if it is presented to him
as an individual, and not as a corporate fiduciary.1 65 Conse-
quently, it is commonly asserted along with a third party re-
fusal to deal defense. Because the opportunity is presented to
the fiduciary as an individual, so the defense goes, the fiduciary
should be able to take the opportunity.
The Guth court established a conditional individual capac-
ity defense, requiring that when a "business opportunity comes
to a corporate officer or director in his individual capacity
rather than in his official capacity" the opportunity must not be
"essential to [the] corporation," the corporation must not have
an "interest or expectancy" in the opportunity, and the fiduciary
must not have "wrongfully embarked the corporation's re-
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1027.
164. Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1027.
165. See Note, Corporate Opportunity, supra note 9, at 777 ("Where [a] third
party is not shown to have had a particular expectation that the opportunity would
be made available to the corporation, but merely had given the executive the op-
tion of giving it to the corporation, the executive would seem to have encountered it
in his individual capacity and therefore to be under no duty to disclose.").
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sources" in pursuing the opportunity. 166 The distinction be-
tween a fiduciary's individual and corporate capacity, however,
is plagued by the same indeterminacy encountered with the
fairness test/defense. In fact, the individual capacity defense
may just be a conclusion of law for courts applying a fairness
test. For example, one court has stated that "[t]he test of
whether a particular opportunity is an individual or corporate
one seems to be whether there was a specific duty, on the part of
the officer ... to act or contract in regard to the particular mat-
ter as the representative of the corporation-all of which is
largely a question of fact."167
The Miller court recognized that although an opportunity
may be corporate under its first inquiry, "whether the opportu-
nity was presented to [the fiduciary] in his official or individual
capacity" is relevant to show that the fiduciary did not violate
his duty of loyalty to the business.1 68 The ALI test also seem-
ingly accepts the defense. Under the ALI test, a corporate op-
portunity exists when there is an
opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a director or
senior executive becomes aware . . . [i]n connection with the per-
formance of functions as a director or senior executive, or under
circumstances that should reasonably lead the director or senior
executive to believe that the person offering the opportunity ex-
pects it to be offered to the corporation .... 169
166. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). Accord Broz v. Cellular Info.
Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del. 1996).
167. Paulman v. Kritzer, 219 N.E.2d 541, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (citation
omitted); see also Chem. Dynamics, Inc. v. Newfeld, 728 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987). The Paulman court, however, offered several factors that should be
analyzed when determining whether the opportunity was individual or corporate.
Paulman, 219 N.E.2d at 546. Two specifically address how the opportunity was
presented to the fiduciary and whether corporate assets were used to exploit it:
Whether a corporate officer has seized a corporate opportunity for his own
depends not on any single factor nor is it determined by any fixed standard.
Numerous factors are to be weighed, including the manner in which the of-
fer was communicated to the officer,... [and] the use of corporate assets to
acquire the opportunity.
Id. at 546.
168. Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81-82 (Minn. 1974).
169. ALI, supra note 43, § 5.05(b)(1)(A). The comment to § 5.05(b) states:
Section 5.05(b)(1)(A) also covers opportunities that are presented to the se-
nior executive or director under circumstances that should reasonably lead
the senior executive or director to believe that the person offering the oppor-
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/3
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One comment to the ALI test, however, seems to explicitly re-
ject the defense, stating that the test "applies the doctrine of
corporate opportunity to defined opportunities that come to di-
rectors or senior executives in either their individual or corpo-
rate capacity."170 But, although the language in the comment
seems to reject the defense, the ALI test may contemplate some
cases where the defense is applicable.
III. A PROPOSED STATUTE
This Article's proposed statute retains a broad "Guth-plus"
test for establishing the existence of a corporate opportunity17'
and places the burden of production for showing the existence of
a corporate opportunity on the complainant business. Moreo-
ver, the proposed statute rejects both the fairness test/defense
and the strict tests for corporate opportunity claims. Therefore,
a fiduciary is not permitted to argue that his taking of an oppor-
tunity was fair to the business after the fact; but the test also
does not require a fiduciary to disclose the opportunity to the
appropriate decisionmaking body, as the strict disclosure tests
mandate. Instead, if the business satisfies its initial burden of
showing the existence of a corporate opportunity, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the fiduciary. The fiduciary must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the business consented to
the taking before the fiduciary proceeded; (2) the business was
not financially able to take the opportunity when it arose; or (3)
tunity expects it to be offered to the corporation rather than taken person-
ally. Accordingly, the focus under this provision is on whether a reasonable
person in the position of the senior executive or director would assume that
an opportunity was proffered for personal or corporate benefit. The director
or senior executive has a duty of reasonable inquiry as to whether the oppor-
tunity was intended for the corporation.
Id. § 5.05(b) cmt. (b)(1) (emphasis added).
170. Id. § 5.05 cmt. c.
171. Professor Davis's "comparative advantage" approach may be a preferred
alternative to using a "Guth-plus" approach to establish the existence of a corpo-
rate opportunity. Davis's main criticism of the Guth test rests primarily on the
fact that the "traditional approach ... focuses more on the existence of a competi-
tive advantage at the implementation stage rather than the development stage"
and therefore because his approach "favors granting the opportunity to the party
with the comparative advantage at the development stage" the Guth standard
should be modified with this goal in mind. Davis, supra note 19, at 267. Although
this approach may be allocatively optimal, it would entail a complete overhaul of
the existing corporate opportunity doctrine.
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the business's decisionmaking body ratified or acquiesced to the
taking after it realized the fiduciary took the opportunity for
herself.
Corporate Opportunity
Subdivision 1. Applicability. This section applies to both closely
held/non-public business entities and public business entities, includ-
ing corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies.
Subdivision 2. Establishing a Corporate Opportunity. A corpo-
rate opportunity is established if the complainant shows by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the opportunity
(a) arose out of a preexisting right, interest, or expectancy;
(b) was in the line of business;
(c) was within the avowed business purpose;
(d) was reasonably incident to the present or prospective opera-
tions; or
(e) was of practical advantage, even if the opportunity was not in
the line of business.
Subdivision 3. Fiduciary Defenses. A fiduciary is not liable for a
usurpation of a corporate opportunity established under subdivision 2,
if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
(a) decisionmaking body was disinterested, if applicable; and
(b) disinterested decisionmaking body categorically consented to
the taking of the opportunity before the fiduciary proceeded, through
blanket consent; or
(c) disinterested decisionmaking body individually consented to
the fiduciary taking the particular opportunity; or
(d) disinterested decisionmaking body ratified the taking of the
opportunity by the fiduciary after it was discovered; or
(e) business entity was financially unable to exploit the opportu-
nity within a reasonable time after it arose; and
(1) the fiduciary shows by clear and convincing evidence that he
did not breach his duties of fidelity and diligence by failing to
improve the financial ability before individually taking the
opportunity.
Subdivision 4. Consent Reviewed Under Business Judgment
Rule. If a complainant challenges an authorization by a decisionmak-
ing body to permit a fiduciary to take an opportunity either by individ-
ual or blanket consent, or through after the fact ratification of the
fiduciary's conduct, any such challenge shall be subject to the business
judgment rule in this jurisdiction.
[Vol. 23:83
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Subdivision 5. Corporate Opportunity Contracts. Notwith-
standing any provision of this section, a business entity may, by ex-
press written agreement, alter or eliminate liability for breach of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty and this section.
IV. A DEFENSE OF THE PROPOSED STATUTE
In this Part, the proposed statute is defended, based on the
hypothetical contract model expounded in Part II. One note,
however, before we begin. Trying to pigeonhole a particular fi-
duciary defense into a hypothetical contract model has minor
drawbacks. One of these drawbacks is a certain level of specu-
lation. As Professor Chew correctly recognizes, courts (and this
Article) should use particular guidelines when assessing
whether a fiduciary defense is consistent with a hypothetical
contract model. As Professor Chew states:
First, the courts should begin with an understanding of the basic
relationship between the corporation and fiduciaries. Analogizing
current fiduciaries to trustees or even to the historically rigid fi-
duciary role is outdated.... [T]he corporate-fiduciary relationship
is more analogous to an agency, employee, or partnership rela-
tionship where the duties and rights of both parties are recog-
nized and flexibility negotiated....
Furthermore, if the parties had negotiated a corporate opportu-
nity provision, they would have been in positions to negotiate
terms in their own best interests. Their relative parity helps en-
sure that the agreement fairly accommodates the corporation's
and the fiduciaries' interests. The corporation would negotiate
terms that protect the integrity of the corporate-fiduciary rela-
tionship and the corporation's competitive position. The fiducia-
ries would negotiate terms that protect their right to compete and
to start new businesses. Society's interest in promoting competi-
tion and entrepreneurship efficiently coincides with the fiducia-
ries' interests. 172
A. Rejection of the Close Versus Public Distinction
Although some commentators suggest that courts should
treat corporate opportunity claims differently depending on
whether the business is public or private, 173 such a distinction,
172. Chew, supra note 20, at 493 (footnotes omitted).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 67-78.
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though possibly analytically defensible, results in more confu-
sion in an already confusing area of law.174
Understandably, most corporate opportunity claims arise
in the close corporation context' 7 5 where fiduciaries are
uniquely privy to new opportunities that could easily be ex-
ploited by the business. When these opportunities are
presented, fiduciaries are most likely less informed than their
public corporation counterparts about the restrictions of the
corporate opportunity doctrine, and, in particular, the scope of
their duty of loyalty to their closely held business. In contrast,
it is safe to assume that public corporation officers and directors
have a better understanding of their fiduciary duties to their
businesses. If a different rule is justified for public officers and
directors, such a rule must assume the premise that public of-
ficers and directors are more predisposed to take corporate op-
portunities. 76 Common sense suggests that public officers and
directors will not jeopardize their lucrative positions at public
corporations, and any future corporate employment, in an at-
tempt to cash in by taking a lone corporate opportunity for
themselves. 177
174. Professor Talley also criticizes the public versus private distinction on
technical efficiency grounds. According to Talley
categorical prohibition [is] somewhat extreme. In particular, even if owner-
ship structure is a good proxy for information asymmetry, it does not follow
that categorical prohibition is the best judicial response. On the con-
trary,... information asymmetries actually provide a rationale for institut-
ing incentive schemes, which by nature may consciously permit the
fiduciary to divert at least some projects for her own account.
Talley, supra note 17, at 284.
175. See Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1061 (noting "that the formula-
tion of corporate law doctrines by state courts has been pervasively influenced by
the fact that the overwhelming majority of corporate cases coming before state
courts have involved close corporations"); Begert, supra note 145, at 853 ("Since
most corporate opportunity cases involve closely held corporations, the corporate
opportunity rule for close corporations is, in many ways, the corporate opportunity
doctrine."). But remember, however, that corporate opportunity claims also may
play a significant role in large corporate transactions. See supra note 117.
176. See Talley, supra note 17, at 352 ("[T]o the extent that ownership struc-
ture is an indirect proxy for information structure, legal distinctions between pub-
lic and close corporations appear to be justified.").
177. It is interesting that Brudney and Clark are so skeptical of the loyalty of
public officers and directors when one considers the career impact of leading a
public corporation into financial distress to "steal" a corporate opportunity. Brud-
ney and Clark hypothesize that any corporate incapacity defense "tempts the of-
ficers to fail to exercise their best efforts to make the corporation able to overcome
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/3
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B. Rejection of Strict Disclosure
Noticeably, and contrary to the recent trend,178 the pro-
posed statute does not require a fiduciary to disclose an oppor-
tunity to his business before taking it. 179 The statute rejects
strict disclosure because it may unduly discourage economic in-
novation and decrease allocative efficiency. The statute also re-
jects the categorical prohibitions proposed by Brudney and
Clark, in the case of public corporations. 8 0
The Delaware Supreme Court in Broz v. Cellular Informa-
tion Systems succinctly articulated why a fiduciary should be
permitted limited defenses, particularly the financial inability
defense, under the corporate opportunity doctrine. The court's
underlying rationale is equally relevant when formulating a
statute that does not require per se disclosure to a decisionmak-
ing body:
[Defendant] was entitled to proceed in his own economic interest
in the absence of any countervailing duty. The right of a director
or officer to engage in business affairs outside of his or her fiduci-
ary capacity would be illusory if these individuals were required
to consider every potential, future occurrence in determining
whether a particular business strategy would implicate fiduciary
duty concerns. In order for a director to engage meaningfully in
business unrelated to his or her corporate role, the director must
be allowed to make decisions based on the situation as it exists at
the time a given opportunity is presented. Absent such a rule, the
the disability." Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1027. The author is skeptical
of this view, and, in fact, the opposite may be true in most cases. Butler and Rib-
stein observe:
Corporate managers recognize that they can improve the performance of the
firm by reducing agency costs. Managers compete with one another to attain
the top positions in their companies, and most promotion decisions are made
on the basis of an individual's productivity .... Thus, competition for mana-
gerial services, both inside and outside the corporation, encourages manag-
ers to act in shareholders' best interests.
Butler & Ribstein, supra note 30, at 27.
178. See supra Section B of Part II (discussing the strict disclosure require-
ments of the Brudney and Clark and ALI approaches).
179. Of course, disclosure should create a "safe harbor" for a risk adverse fidu-
ciary. See Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 128 (Conn. 1997) ("adequate disclo-
sure ... is an absolute defense to fiduciary liability"); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys.,
Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996) (presenting the opportunity creates a "safe har-
bor" for the fiduciary).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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corporate fiduciary would be constrained to refrain from exploit-
ing any opportunity for fear of liability based on the occurrence of
subsequent events. This state of affairs would unduly restrict of-
ficers and directors and would be antithetical to certainty in cor-
poration law.18 '
Simply put, and in line with this reasoning, strict disclosure po-
tentially inhibits fiduciaries from exploiting profitable opportu-
nities that a business does not have the ability to exploit, by
creating a process where the business has the ability to prevent
the fiduciary from exploiting the opportunity.
The principal shortcoming of the strict disclosure/categori-
cal prohibition tests182 is that if a fiduciary is presented with an
opportunity that is profitable, yet at the same time fleeting, a
business that is not financially able to take the opportunity may
be able to claim the opportunity for itself and "store it away,"183
presumably for expected future exploitation. 8 4 Meanwhile, the
opportunity may be lost to an equally efficient competing busi-
ness, it may be exploited inefficiently by another business, or it
may not be exploited at all. 85 In the first two cases both the
181. Broz, 673 A.2d at 159.
182. One may assume the strict disclosure tests provide fiduciaries, busi-
nesses, and courts with absolute certainty and predictability to guide their con-
duct. In practice, such certainty may be illusory. As Professor Chew notes,
"[u]nresolved issues include such fundamental topics as when disclosure is re-
quired, who is obligated to disclose, to whom disclosure must be made, and exactly
what information must be disclosed." Chew, supra note 20, at 483.
183. The Northeast Harbor Golf Club court did not recognize this potential
problem when it adopted the ALI's strict disclosure test; instead, the court noted
that disclosure "protects the fiduciary's ability pursuant to the proper procedure to
pursue her own business ventures free from the possibility of a lawsuit." North-
east Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 1995). Although
the ALI test protects fiduciaries from potential lawsuits, it also may prevent them
from taking any opportunity, even when their business entity is financially unable
to exploit new opportunities, making any "protection" of strict disclosure nugatory.
184. The strict disclosure tests such as the ALI test also may "create[ I moral
hazards for disinterested participants. It may, for example, allow a participant to
risk funds on several investments without obtaining a rejection, perhaps believing
that rejection is not necessary. Then, when certain of the investments prove to be
fruitful, other disinterested participants can claim them for the corporation. In
this way the corporation reaps the benefit without assuming any of the risk."
Begert, supra note 145, at 848.
185. Brudney and Clark argue otherwise. For instance, in defending their
categorical denial of opportunities for public fiduciaries, they argue "most foregone
opportunities will be exploited by third parties." Brudney & Clark, supra note 42,
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business and the fiduciary lose and in the latter two, society
loses.
A business has many reasons to force a fiduciary to disclose
a potential opportunity, even when the business is unable to
take the opportunity in the short-run. For instance, it may be-
lieve that its financial situation will quickly improve, and it has
no reason to disfavor third party exploitation of the opportunity
over the benefit to its fiduciary. In both instances, the business
is not competitively harmed. The fiduciary and society, how-
ever, are potentially harmed from requiring strict disclosure.
The fiduciary may have the requisite skills to exploit efficiently
the opportunity. Indeed, if the opportunity comes to a fiduciary
in a certain type of business, the fiduciary likely will have more
than adequate skill to develop and implement the opportunity,
if the opportunity is related to her employment. 8 6 Contrary to
the established bureaucracy of large businesses, "fiduciaries
[can] create start-up operations to develop the innovative idea;
they have no established bureaucracy. Their management is
flexible because they do not yet follow established policies for
committing their resources."18 7 Furthermore, even if a business
does not "store away" the opportunity, the process of obtaining
ex ante consent from a disinterested decisionmaking body may
itself be lengthy, which also could result in the same inefficient
outcomes described above.'88
at 1029. The plausibility of this statement must be based on an assumption that
all opportunities are widely known to exist.
186. Contrary to Professor Chew's analysis of the disadvantages of the strict
disclosure tests, this Article does not recognize her concern about a fiduciary's
right to confidentiality; although her concern noticeably stems from a situation
where a fiduciary is preparing to leave her business to exploit an opportunity. See
Chew, supra note 20, at 482-84. To be sure, a fiduciary should not be required to
disclose her plans to leave her business and exploit an opportunity. Cf. generally
Midwest Janitorial Supply Corp. v. Greenwood, 629 N.W.2d 371 (Iowa 2001). If,
however, the fiduciary plans to remain with the business and simultaneously ex-
ploit an otherwise corporate opportunity, the fiduciary should not be shielded from
disclosure by an abstract notion of a "right to confidentiality."
187. Chew, supra note 20, at 453; cf. Begert, supra note 145, at 848 ("[T~he
strict rule creates a powerful disincentive for small businesspeople to participate
in closely held corporations, thereby diminishing the value of the closely held cor-
poration as an organizational form.").
188. See Chew, supra note 20, at 483; see also Begert, supra note 145, at 859-
60 (noting that requiring formal rejection of opportunities that are clearly outside
current business activities "would invite opportunistic behavior by disinterested
participants without providing any legitimate protection to the corporation ....
129
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Defending the rejection of a strict disclosure requirement
under a hypothetical contract model, however, is a more diffi-
cult task. Admittedly, this analysis slightly differs from a hypo-
thetical contract analysis of the financial inability defense
described below. Here, a hypothetical contract analysis asks
whether the parties would have contracted for strict disclosure
if the parties had contemplated the circumstances ex ante. Be-
low, however, the hypothetical contract analysis asks whether
the business and the fiduciary would have expressly contracted
to permit a fiduciary to take a corporate opportunity if the busi-
ness was financially unable to take the opportunity.
Therefore, here the crucial question is: If the fiduciary and
the business could have foreseen a circumstance where a corpo-
rate opportunity arose, would the parties have agreed that the
fiduciary need not be strictly required to disclose the opportu-
nity to the business? On the one hand, the business may want
to contract expressly for such a requirement because it may be-
lieve ex ante that it should be the only party to decide, at least
initially, whether it wants to pursue the opportunity. But, it
may be equally likely that the business would be indifferent to
requiring a fiduciary to disclose a potential opportunity because
it may believe that in such situations all efforts should be di-
rected at improving its existing operations. Remember, the
statute only permits a fiduciary to take a corporate opportunity,
absent consent, if the business is financially unable to exploit it.
Under this hypothetical contract analysis, therefore, it is
indeterminate whether a business would expressly contract for
a strict affirmative obligation of the fiduciary to disclose a po-
tential opportunity if the business is financially unable to ex-
ploit the opportunity. In light of the offsetting probability of a
highly inefficient outcome in many cases as described above, the
proposed statute adopts the more efficient rule of not requiring
strict disclosure.
[Such a requirement] may be pointless and wasteful as well as an invitation to
hold out during a rejection vote.").
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C. Burden Shifting: Establishing the Existence of a
Corporate Opportunity by a Preponderance of the
Evidence & Requiring the Fiduciary to Rebut
With Clear and Convincing Evidence
Although the proposed statute places the initial burden of
showing the existence of a corporate opportunity on the busi-
ness, it retains the relatively lenient Guth test for establishing
a corporate opportunity and extends it by permitting the busi-
ness to show that the opportunity would have been of practical
advantage to it, even though the opportunity was not techni-
cally in the business's line of business.
Placing the burden of showing that the opportunity was
sufficiently corporate on the business is in line with the major-
ity of case lawi 89 and academic commentary, 190 and it makes
logical sense. A business should not be permitted to bring cor-
porate opportunity claims against its present or former fiducia-
ries unless it reasonably believes that the opportunity was one
that the business would have (and could have) taken and
exploited.191
Although the burden of production is placed on the busi-
ness to show by a preponderance of the evidence that an oppor-
tunity was sufficiently corporate, the burden should be
relatively easy to satisfy. There are many ways an opportunity
can be adapted to a business's existing operations, even though
the opportunity may not have been previously contemplated. 192
189. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 121 (Conn. 1997) ("[The]
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing: (1) a fiduciary relationship between the
corporation and the alleged wrongdoers; and (2) the existence of a corporate oppor-
tunity."); Phoenix Airline Serv. v. Metro Airlines, 397 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Ga. 1990)
("The burden of proof with regard to [establishing a corporate opportunity] rests
upon the party attacking the acquisition."); see also supra note 45 and accompany-
ing text.
190. See Begert, supra note 145, at 851 (placing the initial burden in his pro-
posed rule on the business). But see Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1016
("The intrinsic ambiguity of the [interest and expectancy] concepts suggests, as in
the case of determining whether opportunities are functionally related, that the
burden be placed on the challenged fiduciary to prove the absence of an interest or
expectancy.").
191. See Orlinsky, supra note 44, at 521. Orlinsky argues that "[i]nitially, the
burden of proof rests on the challenger, who must establish that a corporate oppor-
tunity exists." Id.
192. Brudney and Clark forcefully assert this argument in the context of pub-
lic corporations, Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1025, but the author does not
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Therefore, any opportunity that does not clearly fall outside a
business's existing operations, or beyond its ability to modify
those operations, should be classified as a corporate opportunity
as a matter of law. 193
The proposed statute places the ultimate burden of persua-
sion on the fiduciary if the business satisfies its burden of pro-
duction. Raising a fiduciary's burden of persuasion from a
preponderance of the evidence to a clear and convincing stan-
dard194 may deter more fiduciaries from taking opportunities,
but this standard also is in line with the general purpose of the
proposed statute: providing adequate protection for businesses
while at the same time discouraging businesses from storing
away opportunities until they are financially able to exploit
them.
D. Rejected Fiduciary Defenses
The proposed statute also excludes by omission four fiduci-
ary defenses because they do not necessarily facilitate economic
innovation and allocative efficiency, and because they are incon-
sistent with a hypothetical contract theory of the duty of loy-
alty. The rejected defenses are the fairness test/defense, the
legal inability defense, the third party refusal to deal defense,
and the individual capacity defense.
accept their argument that a corporate opportunity exists whenever an opportu-
nity "will produce a risk-adjusted rate of return at least matching that of its cur-
rent operations." Id. The professors note, consistent with the proposed statute,
that
[olne may fairly question why courts should presume a publicly held corpo-
ration to be confined to the line or lines of business in which it currently
operates. Why should it be assumed that an enterprise that starts out in
the electronics business is precluded from moving profitably into the beer-
bottling business? Diversification commends itself to financial theorists as
a way to increase investment returns per unit of risk ....
Id. at 1026.
193. See Note, Corporate Opportunity, supra note 9, at 769 ("Although the line
begins to become unclear [under the line of business test], a sufficiently close link
to current operations should be required so that an executive has adequate gui-
dance in shaping his course of action.").
194. See Ostrowski, 703 A.2d at 128.
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1. Fairness
As stated earlier, the fairness test/defense affords courts
too much discretion to decide corporate opportunity claims on
amorphous, unpredictable equitable considerations 195 and this
"discretion generates much uncertainty about the operational
meaning of the legal rule, [while generating] no offsetting bene-
fits." 19 6 Fairness defenses such as the Miller court's hopelessly
open-ended inquiry into "all other facts and circumstances bear-
ing on the officer's good faith and whether he exercised the dili-
gence, devotion, care, and fairness toward the corporation
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances in like positions" do not provide any guidance to fi-
duciaries when they consider taking opportunities; nor do they
provide a business with any guidance when determining
whether it will prevail on a corporate opportunity claim. 197
The fiduciary and the business are not able to order their
economic behavior and make decisions based on relatively un-
derstandable and predictable rules and standards. What is fair
to one appellate court panel of judges may not be fair to another
panel, even though the two are sitting for oral argument on the
same day. Such indeterminacy should not be tolerated and is
rejected by the proposed statute.
The fairness test/defense also is inconsistent with a hypo-
thetical contract theory of the duty of loyalty. It is unlikely, and
perhaps incredulous, that a business and fiduciary would ex-
pressly contract for a fairness standard to determine whether
the fiduciary has usurped a corporate opportunity. Expressly
contracting for such a standard to resolve corporate opportunity
disputes would be inefficient and impracticable.
195. See supra Section C of Part II.
196. Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1020.
197. See Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Me.
1995) (noting that the Miller "fairness" inquiry "piles the uncertainty and vague-
ness of the fairness test on top of the weaknesses in the line of business test"); see
also Talley, supra note 17, at 295 (noting that the "shortcomings [of the fairness
defense] have, in part, led commentators and courts to proclaim that the fairness
test as applied to the [corporate opportunity doctrine] merely muddies the waters,
adds new layers of confusion to already murky doctrine, and provides no predict-
able guidelines. Consequently, the fairness test has held only modest sway within
courts and among academics" (citations omitted)).
133
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2. Legal Inability & Third Party Refusals to Deal
Although it also is commonly recognized as a legitimate de-
fense to corporate opportunity claims, 198 the legal inability de-
fense also is unsatisfactory and rejected by the proposed statute
because in most cases a business can take affirmative steps to
remedy any legal impediment to exploit an opportunity, if the
opportunity is initially disclosed to the appropriate decision-
making body. 199 After disclosure, the dispositive question
would be whether the business "could have overcome the [legal]
disability by amending [its] charter or securities registration
statement, by forming a subsidiary, or by procuring revocation
of the offending legislation. '' 20 0 This inquiry should properly be
resolved by the business, and should not be decided by the fidu-
ciary who may or may not be in a position to determine impar-
tially the feasibility of remedial measures. 201 Therefore, absent
adequate disclosure to the appropriate decisionmaking body,
the fiduciary should not be able to assert a legal inability de-
fense after the fact.20 2
198. See supra Section C of Part II.
199. See Kerrigan v. Unity Sav. Ass'n, 317 N.E.2d 39, 43-44 (Ill. 1974). Con-
tra Begert, supra note 145, at 852.
200. Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1022.
201. Cf Note, Corporate Opportunity, supra note 9, at 773-74.
Any exception for bylaw obstruction to corporate action is also of dubious
desirability, if the bylaws can be amended by the directors themselves.
Since the directors can modify the bylaws simultaneously with a decision to
act on the opportunity, a corporate decision need not be unduly delayed.
And while an executive may be entitled to measure his obligations by the
relatively stable limitations of law and charter provisions, permitting a com-
parable reliance on the transitory provisions of the bylaws seems highly
prejudicial to legitimate corporate interests and out of tune with the reason-
able expectations of the corporate employer.
Id. David Brown makes a similar argument:
The defense of legal disability puts the diverting fiduciary in the initial posi-
tion of determining the legality or illegality of the corporation engaging in a
particular activity. Given the fiduciary's self interest in finding that it is not
legal .. .the likely outcome of his decision is clear. Moreover, in many in-
stances a legal disability can be corrected by amending a by-law or creating
a subsidiary to engage in a business in which the parent company is not
allowed to engage.
Brown, supra note 44, at 265.
202. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has whole-heartedly re-
jected the legal inability defense, as well as the financial inability defense. Al-
though the author disagrees with the court's rejection of the financial inability
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This view also comports with the promotion of allocative ef-
ficiency and economic innovation. If a business is only pre-
cluded from profitably taking an opportunity by a technical by-
law provision or by operation of law, it is likely efficient to allow
the business to attempt to change such legal and regulatory im-
pediments-provided that the attempt be made within a rea-
sonable time.
Rejecting the legal inability defense also is consistent with
a hypothetical contract analysis. If the business and fiduciary
had contemplated circumstances where an opportunity was
presented to a fiduciary and where the business was not legally
able to take it, the business would likely insist that the fiduci-
ary disclose the opportunity thereby allowing the business suffi-
cient time to rectify the legal or regulatory impediment.20 3
Similarly, the unwillingness of a third party to deal with a
business should not be permitted as a defense to a corporate
opportunity claim, absent disclosure. This defense also is re-
jected mainly because it presents significant evidentiary
problems. For example, if a fiduciary and a third party (who
presented the opportunity to the fiduciary) are successful in
their independent collaboration, it would not be in either party's
interest to admit later that the third party also was interested
in working with the business at the outset. Such an admission
could establish, as a matter of law, the existence of a corporate
opportunity, and, in turn, lead to the imposition of a construc-
defense, the court's discussion when rejecting the legal inability defense is
instructive:
[T]o ensure fairness to the corporation, opportunities must be presented to
the corporation without regard to possible impediments, and material facts
must be fully disclosed, so that the corporation may consider whether and
how to address these obstacles .... Without such a rule, the fiduciary's self-
interest may cloud his judgment or tempt him to overlook his duties.
Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 181 (Mass. 1997).
203. This is similar to the argument Professor Talley makes in proposing an
information based corporate opportunity theory. See Talley, supra note 17, at 351.
Talley suggests that in cases where "private" information is only available to the
diverter, even diversion of opportunities that lie far outside the business's line of
business should be proscribed because of the informational asymmetry between
the fiduciary and the business. See id. at 351-52; see also Note, Corporate Oppor-
tunity, supra note 9, at 774 (noting that permitting a by-law obstruction that can
be easily remedied by the board of directors to absolve a fiduciary from liability
"seems highly prejudicial to legitimate corporate interests and out of tune with the
reasonable expectations of the corporate employer").
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tive trust on the fiduciary's interest in the diverted opportunity
in favor of the business. Therefore, "if third parties show an
unwillingness to deal with the corporation, [the fiduciary]
should disclose this fact and attempt to cure the problem." 20 4
The proposed statute's rejection of the third party refusal to
deal defense also is consistent with the promotion of economic
innovation and allocative efficiency, as well as with a hypotheti-
cal contract analysis, for the reasons stated above in rejecting
the legal inability defense.
3. Individual Capacity
The proposed statute also rejects the individual capacity
defense. This defense is rejected for much of the same reasons
asserted above in the third party refusal to deal context: there
are significant evidentiary problems associated with showing
that an opportunity was presented to a fiduciary in his individ-
ual capacity. Furthermore, a corporate fiduciary is always sub-
ject to the duty of loyalty; therefore, he is under a constant duty
to promote the interests of his business, even if an opportunity
is arguably presented to him in his individual capacity. 20 5
If the defense were permitted, what would be an objective
standard for whether an opportunity was presented to the fidu-
ciary in his individual capacity as opposed to his corporate ca-
pacity?20 6 Any after the fact inquiry would be problematic for a
204. Begert, supra note 145, at 835. Professor Chew correctly notes that in
cases where there is a third party refusal to deal and where any action by the
business could not influence the third party, the fiduciary should be permitted to
take the opportunity, assuming there is full disclosure. See Chew, supra note 20,
at 476.
205. But see Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 155 (Del. 1996)
(noting that one of the dispositive factors in the case was "that Broz became aware
of the . . . opportunity in his individual and not his corporate capacity").
206. Professor Davis succinctly summarizes the inherent problems with the
individual capacity defense when discussing Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v.
Harris:
Why should it matter . . . whether the broker approached Harris as the
club's president rather than as an individual? It was not as if he was the
holder of some special benefit that he sought to confer on the club alone.
Real estate brokers are not generally in the business of philanthropy. His
job was to get the best deal for his client. Had he possessed more complete
information and anticipated Harris's personal interest in the property, he
presumably would have approached her in her individual capacity as
well .... It seems strange, therefore, to make Harris's fiduciary duty turn
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court because the only parties privy to that type of information
would be the fiduciary and the party who approached her with
the opportunity. 2 7 Not surprisingly, both parties, if successful,
would claim that the third party presented the opportunity to
the fiduciary because the fiduciary was a friend or acquain-
tance, not the fiduciary of a particular business.
Finally, a fiduciary is a fiduciary twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week-at least for full-time executives. 208 When
an opportunity is presented to the fiduciary in any manner, she
should disclose the opportunity to the business first, and if it
rejects the opportunity, then she may take it.2 °9
on what the broker happened to know at the outset about her personal in-
vestment preferences.
Davis, supra note 19, at 260.
207. See Gelb, supra note 58, at 400 (noting that probable evidentiary
problems with the individual capacity defense dictate that 'a director should be
held to a high standard of fiduciary responsibility no matter how he or she becomes
aware of certain opportunities"). For this reason a third party refusal to deal de-
fense also may be accompanied by the defense that the opportunity was presented
to the fiduciary as an individual. See supra Section C of Part II.
208. This proposition may be tempered in the case of outside corporate direc-
tors. In such a case, rejection of the individual capacity defense may be unwar-
ranted in light of a hypothetical contract analysis. As one commentator writes:
A reasonable outside director, for example, would not give up all interests
upon agreeing to work for [a] company, nor would the company expect the
director to do so. Many outside directors have significant interests in the
same industry .... By assuming positions as fiduciaries, moreover, officers
and directors have not relinquished all rights to pursue personal opportuni-
ties made available to them. Such a rule would amount to corporate slav-
ery, considerably increasing the salaries corporations would have to pay
fiduciaries to work for the company.
Fielding, supra note 18, at 225; see also ALI, supra note 43, § 5.05 cmt. c, illus. 1
(noting that "under § 5.05 directors who are not senior executives have no obliga-
tion to offer an opportunity to the corporation simply because the opportunity is
closely related to the corporation's business").
209. But see Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81-82 (Minn. 1974) (noting that
"whether the opportunity was presented to [the fiduciary] in his official or individ-
ual capacity" is a relevant factor under its "fairness" inquiry); Solimine v. Hol-
lander, 16 A.2d 203, 215-18 (N.J. Ch. 1940) (finding that the opportunity came to
the defendants in their individual capacity); Note, Corporate Opportunity, supra
note 9, at 777 ("Where the third party is not shown to have had a particular expec-
tation that the opportunity would be made available to the corporation, but merely
had given the executive the option of giving it to the corporation, the executive
would seem to have encountered it in his individual capacity and therefore to be
under no duty to disclose." (emphasis added)).
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E. Accepted Fiduciary Defenses
The proposed statute accepts three fiduciary defenses to
corporate opportunity claims. First, the statute permits a fidu-
ciary to assert that the business, either through a blanket provi-
sion in a corporate instrument or individually, consented to the
fiduciary's taking of an opportunity before he personally took it.
Business consent may come in the form of an affirmative grant
of the opportunity by a disinterested decisionmaking body to
the fiduciary. Business consent also may be implied from the
circumstances if the decisionmaking body did not expressly ob-
ject, after disclosure, within a reasonable time, taking into ac-
count a typical time-frame for corporate decisionmaking.
Second, the fiduciary may assert that the business was finan-
cially unable to take an opportunity at the time it arose, pro-
vided that the fiduciary complied with his duties of fidelity and
diligence in attempting to resolve the business's financial
problems. Finally, a fiduciary may assert that a decisionmak-
ing body ratified (or, to put it another way, consented to or rati-
fied after the fact) the fiduciary's taking of an otherwise
corporate opportunity.
These three defenses are retained by the proposed statute
because they are consistent with the statute's goal of promoting
economic innovation and allocative efficiency, but, more impor-
tantly, because the defenses are consistent with a hypothetical
contract theory of the duty of loyalty without undermining the
duty of loyalty as a substantive restraint on fiduciary conduct.
1. Individual or Blanket Consent
As described in Part II, most courts and commentators 210
permit a fiduciary to take a corporate opportunity if the fiduci-
ary first discloses the opportunity to the relevant decisionmak-
ing body and receives affirmative consent from that body to
take the opportunity. 211 Affirmative ex ante consent by the bus-
iness promotes economic innovation and allocative efficiency be-
210. See Orlinsky, supra note 44, at 521 (stating that the fiduciary must rebut
a showing that a corporate opportunity exists by proving financial inability "or
that the opportunity, after full disclosure to the board or stockholders, was
rejected").
211. See Note, Corporate Opportunity, supra note 9, at 774 ("Placing the bur-
den of proving full disclosure upon the executive and requiring disinterested rejec-
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cause if the business decides not to exploit a particular
opportunity, it likely would not have been the most efficient ex-
ploiter of the opportunity. 212 Moreover, permitting an affirma-
tive consent defense is consistent with a hypothetical contract
analysis because it is in one sense an express agreement: the
fiduciary and the business have contemplated the opportunity
after full disclosure and have mutually agreed that the fiduci-
ary should be permitted to take the opportunity. 213
The more difficult question is whether a consent by non-
activity defense should be permitted under the proposed stat-
ute. A consent by non-activity defense permits a fiduciary to
take a business opportunity if she presents the opportunity to
the relevant decisionmaking body, and that body fails to ex-
pressly consent or deny consent to the fiduciary. 214 The pro-
posed statute accepts this defense if the relevant
decisionmaking body fails to take action within a reasonable
time, taking into account, of course, normal and reasonable
timetables for corporate decisionmaking. What the timetable
would be in each particular case would have to be, perhaps un-
satisfactorily, based on the facts and circumstances of each
case.
Any indeterminacy created by a fact-based inquiry into the
reasonableness of a failure to affirmatively consent to or reject
an opportunity is significantly outweighed by efficiency con-
cerns. One of the goals of the proposed statute is allocative effi-
ciency, and a decisionmaking body should bear some
responsibility to decide as quickly as possible whether the busi-
ness will take an opportunity. Otherwise, inefficiency may re-
sult for the same reasons strict disclosure impedes innovation:
the business may store away the opportunity by failing to make
an affirmative decision to accept or reject the opportunity.
tion seem sufficient assurances that corporate interests have received adequate
consideration.").
212. But cf. Brown, supra note 44, at 276 (arguing that in the close corpora-
tion context both board rejection and "unanimous shareholder consent should be
required to allow a corporate fiduciary to develop a corporate opportunity on an
individual basis" because "rejection of a corporate opportunity is a waste of corpo-
rate assets").
213. See Fielding, supra note 18, at 226 (noting that the consent defense
"demonstrates the contractual foundation of the [corporate opportunity] doctrine,
suggesting that the duty of loyalty can be relaxed if the parties agree to do so").
214. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
139
57
140 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:83
Permitting a consent by non-activity defense also comports
with a hypothetical contract analysis. If the business and fidu-
ciary could foresee the circumstances, the business would likely
require the fiduciary to disclose the opportunity for acceptance
or rejection; but the fiduciary would likely insist that if the deci-
sionmaking body did not act within a reasonable time, the fidu-
ciary could take the opportunity for herself.
Finally, blanket consent also is accepted as a fiduciary de-
fense. Under this defense, a fiduciary is absolved from liability
under the corporate opportunity doctrine if the business con-
sents to her taking by providing for such circumstances in its
articles of incorporation, its by-laws, through corporate resolu-
tion, or through a similar corporate instrument.215 Permitting
this defense, as Delaware now does in both its corporate and
LLC statutes,216 promotes allocative efficiency because if the
business decides to disclaim any interest in a particular type of
opportunity ex ante, it likely is not the best-equipped firm to
develop and implement these types of opportunities. Moreover,
permitting a blanket consent defense is consistent with a hypo-
thetical contract analysis because it is really an express con-
tract between the business and its fiduciaries, 217 and such
215. See supra note 116-17 and accompanying text; cf. Brudney & Clark,
supra note 42, at 1019 ("[Tlhe burden should be on the diverter to prove for other
opportunities [not contemporaneously consented to] that the particular diversion
was originally consented to by the founding venturers."). But see, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.241, subd. 4 (1985) ("The articles [of incorporation] shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director ... for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to
the corporation or its shareholders . . ").
216. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17 for a description of the recent
legislation adopted in Delaware that permits the relaxation of the duty of loyalty
for corporate fiduciaries. See generally Cohen, supra note 28, at 459-64 (noting the
various LLC statutes that take a deferential view to enforcing a strict duty of
loyalty).
217. Richard Booth criticizes partnership statutes that provide for total
waiver of fiduciary duties. These statutes, according to Booth, lead to no bargain-
ing between parties over the scope of fiduciary duties. Booth, supra note 29, at 61.
Consequently, "[p]artial waiver, no matter how closely it approaches total waiver,
requires the person with information as to likely conflicts to disclose those conflicts
and to seek advance approval from the other partners. Total waiver in the absence
of specification allows a partner who expects a conflict simply to demand a total
waiver." Id. at 64 (citation omitted). Although this argument has some merit, it
still accepts the normative assumption that businesses and their fiduciaries are
not rational and competent to contract expressly with each other to define their
relationship. Such an assumption, therefore, suffers from the same infirmities as
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provisions give notice to investors and creditors regarding the
scope of the business's fiduciaries' duty of loyalty.
Acceptance of a blanket consent defense would bring corpo-
rations law into line with the statutory rights of partners and
LLC members who currently enjoy relatively wide latitude to
define their rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis their business
through express contract.218 Assuming, at least in the case of a
public entity, that the market for its securities is relatively in-
formationally efficient, blanket consent provisions, if relevant to
the future cash flows of the firm, will permit present and future
investors and creditors to discount the value of the business
accordingly. 219
the traditionalist arguments for enforcing a strict view of the duty of loyalty,
namely, to equalize the parties' relative bargaining power.
218. This is not to say that more could not be done to eliminate restrictions,
particularly in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, which still significantly limit
the ability of partners and their partnership to waive completely ex ante the duty
of loyalty in agreed on situations. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act: Not Ready For Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45 (1993). Rib-
stein correctly notes that the statutory "qualifications are so vague that
sophisticated planners would be foolish to rely on them, but are sure to enmesh in
litigation unfortunate partners who attempt private ordering of fiduciary duties."
Id. at 60. For an example of a state statute that has thrust these provisions on
existing partnerships, perhaps without their knowledge, see MiNN. STAT
§ 323A.12-02 (requiring the Minnesota Revised Partnership Statute to govern all
partnerships after January 1, 2002); § 323A.1-03 (prohibiting the elimination of
the duty of loyalty with strict exceptions).
The relative freedom to contract also is recognized by those commentators who
would retain specific limitations on waiver or modification of fiduciary duties in
the LLC context. For instance, Professor Sandra Miller recognizes:
The growing movement away from the judicial implication of broad fiduci-
ary duties makes it increasingly important for the minority LLC member to
obtain express contractual protections ... including a default buy-out right
and possibly a dissolution remedy. Practitioners' sentiments against judi-
cial monitoring of private enterprises are dramatically changing the busi-
ness law landscape and should not be taken lightly.
Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution Reme-
dies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Com-
pany, 38 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 450 (2001). Miller, however, advocates enacting
statutory protections that would prohibit LLCs from unreasonably restricting or
reducing fiduciary duties or the standard of care primarily to protect the interests
of minority owners because of the "considerable uncertainties surrounding the ju-
dicial interpretation of the duty of loyalty." Id. at 460.
219. Of course, this assumes the securities markets are relatively informa-
tionally efficient. As Butler and Ribstein note,
Where [waivers of fiduciary duties] are enforced against shareholders who
buy into the corporation after the waiver is enacted, it is clear that the basic
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Finally, blanket consent through express ex ante agreement
seems to be the only way to address the inherent conflict neces-
sarily experienced by a director who sits on two different
boards. Ex ante blanket consent would provide relative cer-
tainty for both the director and each business by defining the
director's fiduciary duties vis-a-vis each entity.
220
2. Financial Inability
The proposed statute also retains a limited financial inabil-
ity defense, 221 but the fiduciary must prove that she complied
with her fiduciary duties of fidelity and diligence to improve the
financial condition of the business, if distressed, when the op-
portunity arose. The defense permits a fiduciary to take an op-
portunity if her business is financially distressed, with little or
no hope of recovery. It does not require the business to be insol-
vent; rather, it requires the fiduciary to exercise her duties of
fidelity and diligence to improve the business's financial condi-
tion to permit it to exploit the opportunity.222
question is one of pricing: in light of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothe-
sis, differences between corporations regarding management duties and the
potential for managerial misconduct are reflected in the prices of the securi-
ties of those companies. This efficient market pricing provides pressure to-
ward development of optimal contract terms, including the optimal reliance
on legal constraints such as fiduciary duties.
Butler & Ribstein, supra note 30, at 6 (citation omitted).
220. See John G. Finley, Corporate Governance Issues Related to Strategic In-
vestments in Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 15, 27 n.38 (2002). Fin-
ley notes:
A possible way to deal with corporate opportunity problems raised by the
presence of a director on the boards of both the strategic investor and of the
public company vehicle is for the parties to define carefully the scope of the
directors' fiduciary duties with respect to corporate opportunities in the
charter of the vehicle: "[Tihere is no reason why corporate charters cannot
contain provisions dealing with corporate opportunities or dealing with the
ability of officers or directors to compete with the corporation .... The treat-
ment of'corporate' opportunities by a managing person or entity (or person
controlling one) is a rather prominent candidate for explicit contracting
Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
221. Accord Begert, supra note 145, at 851.
222. But see Brown, supra note 44, at 264. Brown notes:
When the fiduciary decides that the corporation is financially unable to take
the opportunity, he is substituting his own judgment for that of the board of
directors or shareholders. Only when the corporation is insolvent is finan-
cial ability so palpably clear that the law should allow a fiduciary to deter-
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Although some criticize the financial inability defense be-
cause it could create incentives for fiduciary disloyalty, 223 such
concerns are likely misplaced. In most cases, fiduciaries are not
inclined to want their businesses to fail, much as attorneys do
not want their firms to fail.224 A fiduciary would be out of a job
and would be saddled with a potentially profitable, but uncer-
tain, corporate opportunity.
Moreover, not permitting a limited financial inability de-
fense would raise the same economic innovation and allocative
efficiency concerns described above.225 A business-always op-
timistic about recovering financially even in the face of severe
financial distress-may be inclined to store away the opportu-
nity until such time it is able to exploit the opportunity. 226
mine on his own that the corporation is financially unable to exploit the
opportunity and to develop the opportunity without tendering it to the
corporation.
Id.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 155-64.
224. See Begert, supra note 145, at 859. Begert observes:
The rejection [of incapacity defenses] presumably represents a reaction to
the problem of participants withholding their best efforts in order to create
the false appearance of corporate inability. But such a reaction is based on
the questionable premise that participants will be willing to run their corpo-
rations into the ground in order to create inability. The threat of a direct
suit for failure to use best efforts should adequately deter such conduct.
225. Although not directly on point, Richard Booth's discussion of the costs
and benefits of diluting or waiving fiduciary duties is instructive:
Although fiduciary duty may sound at first like one of those things of which
more is always better, it is not. Fiduciary duty can easily be used by oppor-
tunistic partners to unduly confine the side activities of other partners. The
casebooks are replete with cases in which principals have sought to prevent
their agents from taking advantage of opportunities in which the principal
had no genuine expectation, and cases in which principals have sought to
prevent their agents or former agents from competing, sometimes only after
waiting to see whether or not the competitive venture was successful.
Booth, supra note 29, at 59.
226. Cf. Davis, supra note 19, at 237. Professor Davis criticizes this rationale
for a financial inability defense when applied to an opportunity that is within a
business's interest and expectancy. He writes that the financial inability "qualifi-
cation ignores whatever development efforts the corporation undertook to reach
the interest or expectancy threshold. Even though the corporation is financially
incapable of taking advantage of the opportunity, the better rule would be to as-
sure it some compensation for those successful development efforts by prohibiting
others from taking advantage of the opportunity without the corporation's con-
sent." Id. Professor Davis has a point, although the applicability of his argument
is misplaced. The financial inability defense contemplated by the proposed statute
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Therefore, the same allocative efficiency concerns encountered
with the strict disclosure tests and the consent by non-activity
defense are present if a limited financial inability defense is not
permitted. 227
Permitting a limited financial inability defense also is con-
sistent with a hypothetical contract analysis. If the parties
would have contemplated severe financial distress (how many
parties would do this at the outset?) they would likely come to
the conclusion that if a fiduciary is unable to rectify the busi-
ness's financial problems through reasonable diligence, he
should be permitted to take the opportunity personally.
3. After the Fact Ratification
Although no cases have been found accepting after the fact
ratification by a decisionmaking body as a defense to a corpo-
rate opportunity claim, the defense is accepted by the proposed
statute. 228 After the fact ratification by a disinterested decision-
making body is permitted as a defense because, although it may
not necessarily promote allocative efficiency, it is consistent
with a contractual theory of the duty of loyalty.
After the fact ratification of a fiduciary's usurpation of a
corporate opportunity is no different from an ex ante agreement
by the parties permitting the fiduciary to take a certain class of
corporate opportunities. Perhaps a business will ratify a fiduci-
ary's taking to compensate her; more likely, however, the busi-
ness will recognize that it could not have profitably exploited
the opportunity. In any event, the propriety of the decision
would be subject to the business judgment rule. Some commen-
tators will likely criticize after the fact ratification because rati-
would not apply in circumstances where the business has already invested re-
sources in developing an opportunity; it would only apply to those circumstances
where the business had no or a negligible role in the development of the
opportunity.
227. See Orlinsky, supra note 44, at 461-62. Orlinsky, however, goes on to
require that the fiduciary present the opportunity to the decisionmaking body for
acceptance or rejection. Id. at 462. Although this may be good legal advice for a
risk-adverse fiduciary, it should not be required under the corporate opportunity
doctrine.
228. See Canion v. Tex. Cycle Supply, Inc., 537 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976).
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fication is only subject to the business judgment rule.229 Their
argument, then, should be directed at the relative leniency of
the business judgment rule in certain jurisdictions, including
Delaware.
V. CONCLUSION
The statute proposed in this Article attempts to establish a
coherent corporate opportunity analysis that fosters predict-
ability and enforces a relatively strict view of the fiduciary duty
of loyalty. The statute, however, also attempts to foster alloca-
tive efficiency and encourage economic innovation. Consistent
with a hypothetical contract analysis of the duty of loyalty, the
statute essentially retains the traditional tests for establishing
the existence of a corporate opportunity. But, the statute does
not require a fiduciary to disclose all corporate opportunities to
his business; although he may decide to do so to protect against
future litigation. Rather, the statute permits a fiduciary three
limited defenses that must be established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. The statute recognizes that the rejection of strict
disclosure and the acceptance of limited fiduciary defenses will
promote innovation and allocative efficiency, by not permitting
businesses to store away opportunities for later, uncertain ex-
ploitation. Finally, the statute unequivocally rejects the fair-
ness test/defense that plagues fiduciaries, businesses, and
courts alike. By rejecting any fairness inquiry, the statute rec-
ognizes that in a relatively ordered business atmosphere, such
tests create uncertainty, with no significant offsetting benefits.
229. Cf Brudney & Clark, supra note 42, at 1035-36. In the contemporane-
ous-consent context, Brudney and Clark argue that even after disinterested stock-
holder or director approval, "the 'business judgment' defense should not be
permitted to shield the arrangement from meaningful judicial scrutiny." Id.
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